James Blair Historical Review, Volume 4 by Phillibert, Chris
James Blair Historical Review 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 1 
2013 
James Blair Historical Review, Volume 4 
Chris Phillibert 
College of William and Mary, cpphillibert@email.wm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr 
 Part of the History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Phillibert, Chris (2013) "James Blair Historical Review, Volume 4," James Blair Historical Review: Vol. 4 : 
Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol4/iss1/1 
This Journal is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in James Blair Historical Review by an authorized editor of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, 
please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
1Phillibert: JBHR, Vol. 4
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2013






Hannah Metheny, Managing Editor
Amy Schaffman, Submissions Editor
James Blake, Business Manager








Stephen Bennett Carter Lyon
Robin Crigler Matthew Paganussi
Stephen D’Alessio Margaret Strolle
Online: In addition to this printed issue, the James Blair Historical 
Review can also be accessed online at www.wm.edu/as/history/under-
graduateprogram/The-James-Blair-Historical-Review/index.php.
Cover: Detail. Edwin Forbes, View from the summit of Little Round Top 
at 7:30 PM July 3rd, 1863, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 
Division, Washington, D.C. Image courtesy of the Library of Congress.
3
Phillibert: JBHR, Vol. 4
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2013
Editor’s Note: 
 While at breakfast at my supervisor’s home, our conversa-
tion soon delved into our favorite aspects of history. My supervisor 
enjoys the European Industrial Revolution, an era that he believes 
was more culturally transformative than contemporary technological 
advancements. Native Americans, particularly the variations between 
tribal groups, interested his friend, and I chimed in with my interest 
in the American Civil War. One lady mentioned that she had recently 
encountered in a crossword puzzle a clue relevant to our theme: 
“Gossip well told.” The answer was “history.”
 Since then, I have been pondering the various connotations 
of the word “history.” To some, it evokes scenes from the classroom, 
of students deeply entrenched in their textbooks to memorize dates 
of significant events. To others, it is simply “gossip well told,” stories 
passed from one individual to the next and through generations intent 
on keeping their past alive. But as my fellow editors, writers, and his-
tory buffs exemplify, it is our passion.
 This year’s volume of the James Blair Historical Review 
celebrates that love. From the African Americans living in Appala-
chia to the Muslims ruled by Akbar the Great to the congressional 
politicians debating food subsidy programs to the civilians fighting 
for the statehood of West Virginia, this issue illustrates the diversity 
of historical interests and scholarship. To us, history is not simply 
our degree concentration but an amalgamation of stories waiting to 
be told. These writers indicate the importance of this task. I join my 
fellow editors in congratulating our four writers on a job well done.
 Furthermore, I would like to thank Professor Hiroshi Kita-
mura, the Publications Council, the Lyon G. Tyler Department of 
History, both the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 editorial boards (es-
pecially Deborah Wood and Amy Schaffman, respectively the new 
Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor of JBHR), and our peer review-
ers for their support. I vividly recall the first meeting of the JBHR 
nearly four years ago, and it is gratifying to see how much has been 
accomplished since then. As I bid farewell to my four years with this 
publication, I wish all the best to the future editors, writers, and peer 
reviewers of this journal.
    Sincerely,
    Kyra Zemanick
    Editor-in-Chief
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silencing the opposition:
West Virginia’s Quest for Statehood and the Suppression of 
Confederate Dissent
  In December of 1861, still only a few months into the Civ-
il War, President Abraham Lincoln found himself mulling over an 
extraordinarily unexpected request: the division of the Confeder-
ate state of Virginia and the preservation of its northwestern terri-
tory, modern-day West Virginia, for the Union. The petition, from 
the Unionist Reorganized Government of Virginia, was unprec-
edented, and its proposal, counseled many statesmen, unconstitu-
tional. Yet Lincoln found himself inclined to honor the request for 
pragmatic and political reasons, not least because “her brave and 
good men regard … [West Virginia’s] admission into the Union as 
a matter of life and death. They have been true to the Union under 
very severe trials.”1 This sentiment has been echoed in Civil War 
literature for more than a century, but its implication—a homog-
enous, federally-minded West Virginian populace—belies a much 
more conflicted reality: a polity at war with itself, a Civil War in 
microcosm, one which could have unified in independent state-
hood under only the most exceptional circumstances. 
 The northwestern counties of Virginia had legitimate and 
longstanding grievances with Virginian economics and politics 
that division promised to remedy—but the border drawn around 
what would become West Virginia included slave-holding, south-
ern-minded counties in the Trans-Allegheny and Shenandoah 
Valley more sympathetic to the Confederate cause and Virginian 
integrity than Lincoln’s musing suggested. Indeed, many propo-
nents of West Virginian statehood warned that these Confederate 
counties’ arbitrary inclusion within the proposed state’s boundar-
ies would jeopardize the entire statehood movement. When the 
elections determining West Virginia’s statehood and its borders 
were held, however, the rebel sentiments of approximately half of 
Christine Camp
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West Virginia’s population seemed nigh nonexistent; in fact, sev-
enteen counties which had voted for Virginia’s secession from the 
Union at the start of the war voted in 1861 and 1863 for the even 
more radical secession of West Virginia from Virginia and the in-
clusion of two dozen Confederate counties within its borders, re-
spectively.2 Ideology played little part in this dramatic turnaround; 
instead, Confederate soldiers and sympathizers in the Trans-Al-
legheny and Shenandoah Valley found themselves coerced into 
compliance or denied a vote entirely by political sleight of hand 
and intervention by the occupying Union Army. Although many 
Confederate regions of West Virginia did eventually vote in favor 
of statehood, this decision represented less of a transformation in 
allegiance or worldview than a pragmatic acknowledgment that 
an end to the bloody war in northwestern Virginia trumped any 
abstract triumph of ideology—particularly when rebel West Vir-
ginians lacked the political voice to do anything but acquiesce.
 Traditional West Virginian literature and historians such 
as Virgil A. Lewis, Charles H. Amber, and George E. Moore reit-
erate Lincoln’s assessment of a thoroughly pro-Union West Vir-
ginia.3 The Union sympathies of western Virginia were “an un-
questioned fact,” argued Moore in 1963, echoing the theses of 
historians before him.4 Writing in the 1960s, Richard O. Curry 
was among the first to challenge this idea of political unity with an 
extensive analysis of the antiwar Peace Democrats, or “Copper-
heads,” in northern West Virginia and the methods of secession-
ist guerrillas—bushwhackers—throughout. “Unionism,” writes 
Curry, “was … not a universal phenomenon in Trans-Allegheny 
Virginia.”5 More recently, historians John W. Shaffer and Kenneth 
W. Noe have expounded upon the political division that made the 
border region of West Virginia such a hotbed for military occupa-
tion and guerrilla warfare during the Civil War.6 This paper con-
tinues investigation in the vein of this more recent scholarship, 
probing the politico-military actions and reactions of West Vir-
ginia’s southeastern counties and the role its civilians played—or 
did not—in the formation of modern West Virginia.
 The northern and southern counties of western Virginia 
10
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol4/iss1/1
Camp SilenCing the OppOSitiOn 11
shared much in common, such as a reluctance to enter the Con-
federacy before the catalytic attack on Fort Sumter and a devout 
belief in white superiority. A northwesterner might have occasion-
ally directed a slaveholder to “go to hell” and keep his business 
out of West Virginia, but he would have done so with the assertion 
that West Virginians could “take care of themselves.” Such state-
ments were thus less a condemnation of slavery than an endorse-
ment of white self-sufficiency. Indeed, during West Virginia’s 
statehood debates, many staunch proponents of division aban-
doned the movement altogether when the Willey Amendment, a 
gradual emancipation proviso, was attached to the statehood bill.7 
Yet the vastly different economic systems of northern and south-
ern counties in the west did result in intractable differences in how 
they related to Virginian government.
  The counties of the Trans-Allegheny southwest and the 
Shenandoah Valley employed slave labor and profited hand-
somely from state policies that reflected the interests of the slave-
holding east. The mountainous terrain of the northwest, however, 
was not conducive to slavery; its people profited more from salt, 
coal, and lumber extraction and from iron and textile production, 
resulting in a need for banks, internal improvements, and politi-
cal reforms—such as representation based on white population 
in both houses of the General Assembly, eradication of tax bi-
ases which favored slave property, and judiciary reform—which 
the disinterested east had little interest in meeting.8 Northwest-
ern newspapers such as The Wheeling Intelligencer frequently 
featured outraged responses to this status quo. “We have been 
‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’ for Eastern Virginia long 
enough!” wrote Marshall M. Dent. “Will you [men of West Vir-
ginia],” asked another northerner, “demand … political power in 
proportion to your white population! Will you demand that all 
kinds of property shall pay taxes in proportion to its value!”9 Such 
letters, however, were printed before Virginia’s secession from 
the Union and indicate less of a desire for severance from eastern 
Virginia than a legislative reconciliation between Virginia’s two 
11
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halves. Such reconciliation might ultimately have saved a united 
Virginia as a member of the United States; greater representation 
of those “unequivocally opposed to secession” in the General As-
sembly would have certainly lent greater weight to their “vote 
against any ordinance, resolution or motion, that has for its object 
the withdrawal of the State from the Federal Union.”10
 Virginia’s ratification of the Ordinance of Secession in 
April of 1861, however, prompted serious contemplation of a 
wholesale departure of the northwestern counties from the state. 
Proponents predicted, erroneously, that preserving western Vir-
ginia for the Union would “save Western Virginia, from being 
dragged into the awful vortex of ruin” which the Confederacy 
epitomized and “secure us against the horrors and disastrous con-
sequences of a hostile war upon our borders.”11 An obvious ques-
tion then poses itself: why would a people intent on removing 
themselves “from that section of the State” that had “wantonly 
disregarded their interests and defied their will” include within 
their borders Trans-Allegheny and Shenandoah Valley counties 
which, for all intents and purposes, aligned themselves politically 
with eastern Virginia and the Confederacy?12
 The decision makes the most sense as an attempt to mol-
lify and ultimately overcome the obstructionist techniques em-
ployed by debaters of West Virginia’s statehood at the Second 
Wheeling Convention. Representatives from secession counties 
were numerous at this convention; if they were to prevent the dis-
memberment of their state, they would be well served to pose a 
legitimate legislative obstacle to statehood rather than bowing out 
of the debate, thereby surrendering the opposing vote. Chapman 
J. Stuart proved an exceptionally capable opponent to the move-
ment, proposing—and winning approval for—an amendment to 
the statehood bill establishing a boundary for the new state which 
included almost every county west of the Blue Ridge in addition 
to Potomac River counties near Washington, regions so averse 
to the division of the state that a legitimate vote for statehood 
within the proposed area would have resulted in the certain failure 
of the movement.13 John S. Carlile, a leading proponent of state-
12
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hood during the early years of the war, condemned this amend-
ment: “They all knew that territory was thus included which must 
vote down a proposition for separation, and he [Carlile] presumed 
that it was so intended.”14 (History would justify Carlile’s suspi-
cions: When Stuart came to chair the boundary committee of the 
new state’s Constitutional Convention in November of 1861, he 
proposed a territorial enlargement of the state which would have 
consisted of twenty-four Union counties with a voting population 
of 211,643 versus forty-five Confederate counties with a voting 
population of 316,308.15) In order for Unionists to pass a state-
hood bill with even a marginal chance of success, its opponents 
needed first to be brought on board; the ultimate compromise 
was a state composed of thirty-nine counties—majority Union-
ist—with provision for the addition of Greenbrier, Pocahontas, 
Hampshire, Hardy, Berkeley, Morgan, and Jefferson counties if 
a majority vote in these counties approved.16 Carlile quickly and 
accurately, however, pointed out a flaw in even this compromise: 
Many of these counties were “largely secession, and would have 
to be coerced, if brought in at all.”17 In fact, Union soldiers had al-
ready made their foray into the territory of modern West Virginia, 
granting Carlile’s statement immediate credence.
 Initially, the demand for Union assistance in the region 
had been a matter of practicality rather than politics; western Vir-
ginians were murdering one another. Wrote Colonel Thomas M. 
Harris to H. H. Withers in June of 1861, “I understand that in 
Braxton, a Union man dare not open his mouth. If there is a new 
State declared, & Braxton, Gilmer and Calhoun, are included in 
it, you will find it necessary to send a sufficient force in those 
counties to keep the rebels under control. There will be no other 
way to get along.”18 Not only had the counties of Braxton, Gilmer, 
and Calhoun voted for the Ordinance of Secession in May, giving 
them incentive to preserve their Confederate allegiance, the coun-
ties bordered Unionist strongholds to the northwest, a situation 
which promised imminent conflict and violence. Even in areas 
without an official Confederate presence, bushwhacking Virgin-
ians were known to target “their own neighbors, who peaceably 
13
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and quietly sustain[ed] the cause of the Union … [making them] 
the victims of their malice and blood-thirsty hate. They pillage, 
burn, destroy, and kill.”19 Another insight of the violence that be-
gan in 1861 and lasted throughout the war paints a more complete 
picture, however: “We have the war in our midst and in some 
sections it is waged, not by army against army, or by any orga-
nized band against another, but by neighbor against neighbor.”20 
This description of West Virginian warfare implies a more recip-
rocal conflict, one in which guerrilla violence perpetrated by both 
Union and Confederate sympathizers resulted in brutality neces-
sitating official intervention; it is certainly worth noting, as did 
Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, that “bloody deeds are 
done in these hills” though “not all on one side.”21
 The Union may not have been so quick to intervene, how-
ever, had it not ample political and strategic motivation for doing 
so. For the same reason that President Lincoln delayed a declara-
tion of universal emancipation—because it could alienate vested 
interests among his desperately-needed constituency—the federal 
government could not afford to sacrifice any region professing 
its loyalty to the Union. Moreover, western Virginia’s inclusion 
of the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, the Ohio River, and the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad gave it logistic significance. Even 
the region’s abundance of natural resources made it worth the 
military investment, as one Virginia secessionist, Henry J. Fisher, 
lamented after the Union made its bid for the territory:
I would have risked a general battle to have got into the val-
ley of the Ohio, to have prevented the vote being taken to-
morrow on the question of the new State of Kanawha [West 
Virginia], which territory is militarily occupied by the Fed-
eral Army … If that vote shall be overwhelmingly in favor of 
it, which is likely to be from the circumstance of the friends 
of the South being overawed … it will be very highly preju-
dicial to the State in a civil and commercial point of view … 
It is the great coal field of America … [and would] supply 
the whole Confederacy with salt.22
14
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol4/iss1/1
Camp SilenCing the OppOSitiOn 15
General George B. McClellan’s Ohio regiments crossed the Ohio 
River and began their trek into western Virginia in May and went 
onto victories at the Battles of Phillipi, Rich Mountain, and Bev-
erly, which curtailed future Confederate occupation in the north-
west.23 The Union kept many troops stationed in the region to 
achieve this end, and though the effort failed to stifle the internal 
civil war that continued to rage in the west, it had a profound ef-
fect on West Virginia’s bid for statehood.
 Federal troops struggled to suppress rebel Virginians in 
part because the Confederate sympathizers of western Virginia’s 
southeastern counties were so powerfully driven by both patri-
otic ideology and simple human greed. Ideologically, many in the 
Trans-Allegheny and Shenandoah Valley considered their fates 
linked to their homeland. “I was a Virginian as were my people, 
and when my state went to war, I saw no other course open but to 
follow the fortunes of the Old Dominion,” wrote one secession-
ist.24 “I am a son of Virginia, and her destiny shall be mine,” wrote 
another.  Such sentiments become significant when a crucial de-
mographic difference between the northwestern and southeastern 
counties of modern West Virginia is analyzed: compared to north-
western Virginians, who were often immigrants to the region or 
the children of such immigrants, southwestern Virginians tended 
to have long family histories in the area and clearly, judging by 
statements like those above, this pedigree resonated powerfully 
with them, giving them incentive to defend their state’s integrity.26
  There were, however, also those compelled to fight for 
more material reasons. A. I. Boreman—the first governor of West 
Virginia—among many others complained of men who “rove 
about in gangs, taking from the people, at their homes and on 
the highways, horses, money, or other valuables.”27 More familiar 
with the rugged landscape of their western homeland than many 
of the Union soldiers who sought to weed them out, these bandits 
could enjoy the fruits of plunder with only moderate fear of appre-
hension. While both groups posed a threat to both Federal soldiers 
and Unionist civilians, the fact that so many Union officials and 
West Virginia locals complained of bushwhacking activity rather 
15
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than the movement of Confederate troops leads to one important 
conclusion: there was little formally-organized opposition to the 
Union in much of the northwest. Indeed, although thousands of 
West Virginian men were recruited for the Confederate cause, 
most of the conflict that took place within West Virginia itself 
existed only in the form of guerrilla warfare. Although “there are 
more rebels, or rather marauders, in the following counties, viz. 
Webster, Braxton, Gilmer, Calhoun, Roane, Jackson and Wirt, 
than there ever has been since the difficult commenced,” wrote 
one Ritchie County Unionist to The Wheeling Intelligencer in No-
vember of 1861, “there is no regularly organized rebel army.”28
 Though the violence and fear instigated by bushwhack-
ing should not be undermined, the failure of southeastern resis-
tance in what would become West Virginia to organize effectively 
had two major implications. First, civilians who opposed—with 
bodily violence—the idea of West Virginian statehood being de-
bated in the Wheeling Congresses could expect little in the way 
of legal or military defense and even less of a voice in the de-
cisions made in 1861 regarding Virginia’s division and in 1863 
regarding West Virginia’s ultimate borders; with the de facto rule 
in the northwest that of the Unionist Reorganized Government of 
Virginia, bolstered as it was by the occupying Union Army, who 
would speak on behalf of the opposition, and who would invite 
their votes? With impunity, federal officials meted out punish-
ments of imprisonment, exile, and execution for bushwhacking 
activity—or for civilian facilitation of such activity.29 And it took 
little to draw the officials’ ire; letters like the earnest plea written 
by Camp Chase inmate R. I. Lucas to Governor Pierpont insisting 
that he had taken “the oath of alegience [sic] to the Constitution 
of the United States and [vowed] to support the constitution of the 
provisional Government of Western Virginia” suggest that, in the 
face of suspicious activity, Union officials detained first and asked 
questions later.30 And certainly, any men who were imprisoned, 
shipped away from the counties in which they were registered to 
vote, and/or dead would have had obvious difficulty participating 
in state and county politics.
16
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 The minimal organization of Confederate opposition in 
western Virginia resulted in a second and perhaps even more 
significant consequence, as implied by the following petition by 
Gilmer county residents to Boreman: “Unless we have troops sta-
tioned here it will be impossible to organize the county into Town-
ships, and participate in the fall elections” (emphasis added).31 
That is to say, because the political process in western Virginia 
was controlled by a provisional Unionist government, areas that 
had totally evaded Union control never even saw the ballot box. 
Guerrilla warfare waged by those with Confederate sympathies 
in this way actually hurt the Confederate cause, and such warfare 
was rampant in western Virginia. Boreman described the situation 
in 1862:
We [in northwestern Virginia] are in a worse condition than 
we were a year ago—These people come to me every day 
and say they can’t stay at home. … They must either have 
protection or abandon the country entirely. … If they attempt 
to stay at home—they must keep their horses hid—and they 
dare not sleep at home, but in the woods—and when at home 
in the day time they are in constant fear of their lives.32
Anarchy characterizes such conditions well—violence-prone and 
devoid of the political process. While in small doses these anar-
chical conditions might have inadvertently helped the cause of 
statehood, as will be shown, the statehood movement could not 
have progressed without at least a nominally democratic vote. Es-
tablishing enough order in the region that at least a handful of 
civilians could vote yea on the question of West Virginian state-
hood and its induction into the United States became a priority for 
Union officials in the area, necessitating a crackdown on guerrilla 
violence—though this was easier said than done.
 Part of the problem, as worded colorfully by Brigadier 
General R. H. Milroy, was that the Union’s “large armies” were 
“useless” on western Virginia’s topography and could “not catch 
guerillas in the mountains anymore than a cow can catch fleas.”33 
17
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West Virginia’s steep crags, winding hills, and deep gorges, it 
must be assumed, gave small bands of bushwhackers the decid-
ed advantage, and such bands were attested to operate with the 
utmost “secrecy and celerity.”34 But if federal and state troops 
were never able to eliminate the bushwhacker threat entirely, they 
nonetheless managed to control lines of communication, strategic 
mountain passes, and centers of population often amenable to the 
Union cause.35 Control of the latter ultimately proved enough to 
enable the elections that would win West Virginia statehood and 
entry into the Union. Indeed, the limited number of polls opened 
worked in the Unionists’ favor, as can be seen from the example 
of Jefferson County.
 Jefferson County citizens had voted in favor of the 1861 
Secession Ordinance by a ratio of 813 to 365, and a Union officer 
later declared the county to be “the worst Secession hold that I 
have ever been in,” suggesting that perhaps Unionists were even 
more outnumbered than the above figure indicates.36 Two years 
later, however, when Jefferson County was offered the vote to de-
termine whether or not it would be admitted to the newly formed 
state of West Virginia, the result was overwhelmingly in favor of 
the Union. The looming question is: why?
 The selective nature of voting is one obvious reason why 
West Virginia was able not only to achieve statehood but annex 
several additional—and Confederate—counties into its territory 
after the fact; in 1863 in Jefferson County, polls were opened in 
only two, Union-occupied cities, and only 250 ballots were cast.37 
But because one cannot assume that only Unionists cast votes—
especially in dramatically Confederate counties—two other ex-
planations are necessary to explain the extraordinarily pro-Union 
elections.
 First, many western Virginians with Confederate leanings 
endured legitimate coercion at the hands of Federal soldiers. Tech-
nically, the Union Army received orders to “religiously respect” 
houses, families, and property rights, but gross abuses of such 
policies by both Union and Confederate soldiers were common 
throughout Union and Confederate territories alike. Western Vir-
18
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ginia proved no exception.38 William S. Rosecrans, who assumed 
control of the Department of Ohio after McClellan departed for 
Washington to assume command of the Army of the Potomac, 
wrote that “numerous claims for damages caused by the wanton 
destruction of private property … have been presented to me al-
most daily since I assumed the command of this Department.”39 
Letters from Federal soldiers reveal how violent this process 
could be and with what degree of contempt for rebel-minded lo-
cals such acts could be committed. “One old bitch said she wished 
all the union army were in hell,” wrote one soldier to his brother, 
“but she soon got over that. They took all her honey 11 scaps & 
hogs & chickens. She was union then thats the only way you can 
fix them.”40 Commander Ebenezer B. Andrews wrote after a suc-
cessful raid of a Confederate encampment at Meadow Bluff, “The 
people of Greenbrier County seemed generally disposed to admit 
their helplessness as secessionists, and showed a disposition to 
make friends with Federal authorities as the stronger power.”41 
Although Andrews writes with more eloquence, both letters sug-
gest that Union soldiers saw intimidation as a legitimate means 
of parting rebellious western Virginians with their Confederate 
sentiments—though it is unlikely that violence encouraged many 
true political conversions.
 Nevertheless, evidence demonstrates that precisely this 
tactic was employed at the polls themselves. Because Union of-
ficials monitored the polls, only the particularly brave or particu-
larly contemptuous dared to vote against Unionism. In Shepherd-
stown, for instance, a staunchly Confederate town under Union 
occupation at the time of the 1863 vote for inclusion in the state of 
West Virginia, only one individual dared to vote no.42 It is unlikely 
that a broader, freer vote would have resulted in either West Vir-
ginia’s ascension to statehood or the inclusion of its most rebel-
lious counties within its borders, and Unionist civilians perceived 
as much. “Nothing Sir [Pierpont],” wrote one Barbour citizen, 
“will hold these traitors to their good behavior, when the Federal 
troops shall have left us.”43 Such a fear was not unfounded, as a 
Gilmer County citizen attested in 1862: “the County has been in 
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a state of Anarchy since the Federal Troops have been withdrawn 
from this place.”44 One should not assume, however, that only 
Unionists feared anarchy.
 As many early historians incorrectly typecast West Vir-
ginians as uniformly pro-Union, it can be easy to typecast the fed-
eral soldiers as invading brutes who won influence only via fear. 
True, few western Virginians experienced a shift in ideology due 
to Union occupation—as much can be surmised from the power 
of the Democratic Party in West Virginia following Reconstruc-
tion.45 But many Confederate-minded westerners became will-
ing, after months or even years of devastating total war, to cast 
a vote for statehood or inclusion within that state. Their desire 
for a southern victory and an undivided Virginia was eventually 
trumped by their desire for security from roving bands of guerril-
las and, in border counties, incursions with Confederate troops. 
Many western Virginians, no matter how ideologically Confeder-
ate, were forced within a short period of time to admit that peace 
and prosperity might be nothing more than pipe dreams without 
an end to the conflict that consumed the region.46
 This reality—confronted by many, though certainly not 
all, West Virginian rebels—echoed that confronted by the Con-
federacy at large. Although bushwhacking and Confederate ac-
tivism in West Virginia persisted throughout the war, civilians in 
Trans-Allegheny and Shenandoah Valley counties found them-
selves outmaneuvered politically and militarily, accepting if not 
embracing the fact that an end to the war—or at least removal 
from the conflict, as many presumed inclusion in the state of West 
Virginia would guarantee—offered a more promising prospect 
than a grueling and bloody war of attrition based on differences 
more economic and political in nature than truly ideological. And 
for those prepared to fight it out to the end—the end, eventually, 
came, and the voices and verdicts of men more powerful than 
the zealous rebels who never laid down their weapons carried the 
day. When Lincoln declared in his rationale for signing into law 
the West Virginia Statehood Bill that “we cannot fully retain their 
[western Virginia Unionists’] confidence, and cooperation, if we 
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seem to break faith with them,” he may have been hinting at more 
than his statement overtly let on.47 Without federal intervention, 
Lincoln likely realized, it seems almost sure that the Virginia-born 
and Virginia-proud residents of the Confederate counties would 
have defeated northwestern Unionists’ attempts at dividing and 
violating a state in which southern sentiment predominated. But 
conviction—or a lack thereof—did not lose that battle for rebel 
civilians, just as it did not turn the tide for the Unionists. Only 
certain friends in higher places, political and military canny and 
fortune, and some degree of serendipity divided Virginia’s two 
thoroughly heterogeneous halves and their respective fates in the 
Civil War.
Endnotes
1 President Lincoln’s Rationale for Signing the West Virginia Statehood Bill, 
31 December 1862, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in 
Richard O. Curry, “Ideology and Perception: Democratic and Republican At-
titudes on Civil War Politics and the Statehood Movement in West Virginia,” 
West Virginia History 44, no. 2 (1983): 142.
2 Richard O. Curry, A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the 
Copperhead Movement in West Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1964), 86.
3 Virgil A. Lewis, ed., How West Virginia Was Made (Charleston: New-Mails 
Company, 1909); Charles H. Ambler, Francis H. Pierpont: Union War Gover-
nor of Virginia and Father of West Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2012); George E. Moore, A Banner in the Hills: West Virginia’s 
Statehood (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963).
4 Moore, Banner in the Hills, 189-190.
5 Curry, A House Divided, 5-6.
6 John W. Shaffer, Clash of Loyalties: A Border County in the Civil War 
(Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2003); Kenneth W. Noe, “Ex-
terminating Savages: The Union Army and Mountain Guerrillas in Southern 
West Virginia, 1861–1865,” in Civil War in Appalachia: Collected Essays, ed. 
Kenneth W. Noe and Shannon H. Wilson (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 2004).
7 Edward L. Ayers, In the Presence of Mine Enemies (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2004), 107; Rufus Maxwell to William C. Curry, 17 February 1852, 
Maxwell-Bonnifield Papers, West Virginia University Library; Curry, A House 
Divided, 10.
8 William W. Freehling and Craig M. Simpson, eds., Showdown in Virginia: 
21
Phillibert: JBHR, Vol. 4
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2013
22 Spring 2013JameS Blair HiStorical review
The 1861 Convention and the Fate of the Union (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2010), 149.  
9 The Wheeling Intelligencer, January 14, 1861; Ibid., January 26, 1861.
10 Ibid., January 4, 1861.
11 Samuel Peden to Waitman T. Willey, 30 April 1861, Willey Papers, West 
Virginia University Library.
12 Journals, Acts and Proceedings of a General Convention of the State of Vir-
ginia Assembled at Richmond, 1861 (Richmond: Wyatt M. Elliot, 1861), 104, 
http://archive.org/details/journalofactspro00virg.
13 Lewis, ed., How West Virginia Was Made, 278.
14 Ibid., 279.
15 Charles H. Ambler, Frances. H. Atwood and William. B. Mathews, eds., De-
bates and Proceedings of the First Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 
1861-1863 (Huntington: Gentry Brothers, 1939), 1:74-76.
16 Lewis, ed., How West Virginia Was Made, 284-288.
17 Ibid., 291-292.
18 Harris to Withers, 18 June 1861, George B. McClellan Papers, Library of 
Congress, quoted in Curry, A House Divided, 48.
19 “The War in Western Virginia,” Cincinnati Times, October 1861, Roy Bird 
Cook Collection, West Virginia University Library, quoted in Curry, A House 
Divided, 74.
20  Henry I. Samuels to Francis H. Pierpont, 22 August 1862, Executive Papers 
of Governor Francis H. Pierpont, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
21 Hayes to his wife, 17 August 1861, in Diaries and Letters of Rutherford B. 
Hayes, ed. C. R. Williams (Columbus: Ohio State Archeological and Historical 
Society, 1922), 2:71, http://ww2.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/hayes/index.cfm.
22 Fisher to George W. Mumford, 23 October 1861, in The War of the Rebel-
lion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 5.917, http://
ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/.
23 Noe, “Exterminating Savages,” 106.
24 John Henry Cammack, Personal Recollections of a Soldier of the Confed-
eracy (Huntington: Paragon Printing, 1920), 5, http://archive.org/details/per-
sonalrecollec01camm.
25 Virginia Free Press, June 13, 1861.
26 Shaffer, Clash of Loyalties, 45-46.
27 The Wheeling Weekly Intelligencer, January 2, 1865.
28 The Wheeling Intelligencer, November 30, 1861.
29 Noe, “Exterminating Savages,” 119.
30 Lucas to Pierpont, 22 September 1862, Executive Papers of Governor Fran-
cis H. Pierpont, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
31 Matthew Holt et al. to Boremen [sic], 3 September 1863, Boreman Papers,
West Virginia Department of Archives and History, Charleston, quoted in 
22
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol4/iss1/1
Camp SilenCing the OppOSitiOn 23
Richard O. Curry and F. Gerald Ham, eds., “The Bushwhackers’ War: Insur-
gency and Counter-Insurgency in West Virginia,” Civil War History 10, no. 4 
(1964): 431.
32 Arthur I. Boreman to Francis H. Pierpont, 20 September 1862, Executive 
Papers of Governor Francis H. Pierpont, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
33 Milroy to Pierpont, 27 October 1862, Executive Papers of Governor Francis 
H. Pierpont, Virginia State Library.
34 The Wheeling Weekly Intelligencer, January 2, 1865.
35 Curry, A House Divided, 8.
36 Chester G. Hearn, Six Years of Hell: Harpers Ferry During the Civil War 
(Baton Rogue: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 48; H. W. Crothers to 
Francis H. Pierpont, 22 April 1862, Executive Papers of Governor Francis H. 
Pierpont, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
37 Hearn, Six Years of Hell, 203.
38 George B. McClellan to the Inhabitants of West Virginia, 23 June 1861, in 
The War of Rebellion, 2:196.
39 Rosecrans to Henry Wilson, 27 Feb 1862, National Archives, quoted in Noe, 
“Exterminating Savages,” 108.
40 Albert George to Brother, 10 December 1861, Albert George Letters, Ohio 
Historical Society, Columbus, quoted in Noe, “Exterminating Savages,” 110.
41 Report of Major Ebenezer B. Andrews, 22 December 1861, in The War of 
Rebellion, 51:56.
42 Hearn, Six Years of Hell, 203.
43 Spencer Dayton to Pierpont, 24 August 1861, Executive Papers of Governor 
Francis H. Pierpont, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
44 Mathew Holt et al. to Boremen [sic], quoted in Curry and Ham, eds., “The 
Bushwhackers’ War,” 431.
45 Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty: An American History, 2nd ed. (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2009), 1:554.
46 Hearn, Six Years of Hell, 202.
47 President Lincoln’s Rationale, quoted in Curry, “Ideology and Perception,” 
142.
23
Phillibert: JBHR, Vol. 4
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2013
24
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol4/iss1/1
25Smith the Delay of implementation
the delay of implementation of the
Wic program
 In the wake of the United States 1968 presidential cam-
paign, three British journalists concluded that “the gap between 
rhetoric and reality” constituted “the most disturbing problem in 
American politics.”1 This indictment of political promises and 
ugly realities echoed the complaints that many politicians, activ-
ists, and community leaders voiced in the late 1960s and early 
1970s about the issue of hunger in America. Though national 
food programs had existed since the Great Depression, Ameri-
can hunger became a national issue only after Senators Joseph 
Clark (D-PA) and Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY) visited the Mis-
sissippi Delta in April 1967. Clark and Kennedy compared the 
hunger of the poor Mississippians who languished in run-down 
shacks to the more familiar and easily explained hunger in Third 
World countries. Clark and Kennedy’s “discovery of hunger” 
shocked the nation. The paradox between the overproduction of 
food in America’s wheat and corn fields and severely malnour-
ished American citizens stirred the hearts of many individuals, 
and anti-hunger rhetoric soon permeated every level of govern-
ment. Documentaries, hearings, exposés, and newly-formed orga-
nizations inundated the public sphere, and mayors, governors, and 
Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon vowed to end 
hunger in America. In 1970, Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC) 
lamented the reality gap that the British journalists had identified. 
Hollings complained that politicians and the American media had 
“flattered” the hungry “with six thousand pages of testimony, 
countless books and articles, hundreds of witnesses, many miles 
of trips…even a White House Conference. Everything except a 
meaningful amount of food.”2
 In 1972, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), chair-
person of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human 
Meagan Smith
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Needs from 1968 to 1977, committed himself to narrowing the 
reality gap. The growing awareness among policymakers and 
medical specialists that pregnant mothers and infant nutrition rep-
resented an investment in national health spurred several com-
mittees and conferences, most notably the 1969 White House 
Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health and the President’s 
Committee on Mental Retardation. Out of these hearings came 
the consensus that poor expectant mothers without access to 
proper nutrition were “dooming their babies to mental retarda-
tion, spreading disease…and costing states and municipalities bil-
lions of dollars in maintaining jails and institutions and financing 
remedial education.”3 The link between childhood malnutrition 
and learning disabilities, chronic poor health, and general social 
disadvantages galvanized Humphrey to sponsor an amendment 
to the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 that created the Special Sup-
plemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC).
 The WIC legislation outlined a two-year, twenty-million-
dollar (per fiscal year) pilot program under the direction of the De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) with help from the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. The program would provide low-
income, at-risk mothers and their children with nutritional supple-
ments but would also assess the medical benefits of such a food 
supplement outreach. The legislation sailed through Congress by 
a wide majority because not only was the 93rd Congress (both 
the House and Senate) dominated by Democrats, but the political 
appeal of feeding pregnant mothers and infants also trumped par-
tisan splits. Despite congressional backing, however, the program 
hit a stumbling block when it reached the USDA. The program 
lay quietly for ten months in the Food and Nutrition Service—“an 
entire fiscal year,” the irate Humphrey complained—before a U.S. 
District Court judge ordered the department to move forward with 
the program’s implementation in the summer of 1973 in Dotson 
v. Butz.4 Five months later, the plaintiffs of the original case filed 
charges against the USDA again because “the USDA still had yet 
to feed one mother or infant.”5 Finally, Senator George McGovern 
26
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol4/iss1/1
27Smith the Delay of implementation
(D-SD) organized the congressional hearing Maternal, Fetal, and 
Child Nutrition “to deal with problems related to the implementa-
tion and continuation of federally funded supplemental food pro-
grams.”6 The question on every anti-hunger politician’s lips: Why 
had the USDA delayed implementation of the program? A second 
and closely-related question also emerged: Why was the USDA 
only planning to spend a portion of the appropriated funds for the 
program?
 Three distinct explanations emerged, though not all of 
them were necessarily mutually exclusive. The first explanation 
came from the USDA itself. The Department argued that the delay 
was for purely practical purposes: they wanted to create the best 
possible program with fiscal responsibility and scientific integrity. 
The second explanation for the delay was far less kind to the De-
partment of Agriculture as many politicians and activists opined 
that the Department’s prioritization of farmers unfairly dismissed 
the poor and hungry. People of this opinion cited the millions in 
farm subsidies the USDA doled out every year and the USDA’s 
push to separate food programs into a different Department as 
proof that the USDA’s agenda did not include the WIC program. 
Finally, some historians have argued that officials in the USDA 
genuinely did not believe that the WIC program had any feasibil-
ity and blocked its implementation on these grounds alone. Ac-
cording to this argument, USDA officials believed that the pro-
gram wasted tax dollars and that the government should focus on 
proven programs like the Food Stamp Program.
 Few, if any, historical analyses of the WIC program give 
each explanation credence; most authors have a clear protagonist 
and antagonist in the battle over WIC. The narrative is always the 
same: while Congress slaved to create programs to distribute food 
to the needy, the conservative USDA refused to fork over cash 
or food. Rarely has the USDA had a voice in the story. For ex-
ample, Loretta Schwartz-Nobel, journalist and author, argues that 
the USDA delay of the WIC program demonstrated an integral 
philosophy in the department to impede legislation that helped the 
hungry. She writes that “the Department of Agriculture’s official 
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and ongoing reaction to the creation of the program for hungry 
pregnant women and their young children was to try to destroy 
it,” and she argues that this apathy was the typical reaction of 
the Department.7 Other historians have also made explicit value 
judgments about the USDA’s behavior, most casting the USDA 
as a ruthless bureaucracy committed to keeping mothers and ba-
bies hungry. These examinations do not entertain the notion that 
the USDA might have prioritized farmers and had different ideas 
about government spending, but could also genuinely commit it-
self to serving its farmer clientele and the hungry because such 
a conclusion would not allow for the compelling drama of the 
villainous USDA and heroic Congress. This paper will attempt to 
reconcile the disparate explanations and show how the USDA’s 
delay was not merely a callous dismissal of the nation’s hungry, 
but the coalescing of several philosophical, economic, and politi-
cal forces on one small program. The narrative of the WIC pro-
gram was not a struggle between good and evil,  but rather a series 
of typical disagreements between the legislative, executive, and 
(to a far lesser extent) judicial branches. As one witness at the 
congressional hearing observed, “It appears that the scientific, po-
litical, administrative, and social considerations which frequently 
are divergent—certainly not complementary in this instance—are 
creating a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion.”8
 The judiciary had its say very early on in the implementa-
tion of WIC. Even before Congress demanded an explanation in 
the Maternal, Fetal, and Infant Nutrition hearing, a coalition of 
non-profit organizations and potential beneficiaries of WIC sued 
the USDA “to compel the expenditure of appropriated funds.”9 
The plaintiffs argued that although the first fiscal year of the pro-
gram was over, the compulsory language of the law (“the Secre-
tary shall use”) required the Department to spend all forty mil-
lion dollars for the program. The USDA argued that it had the 
discretion to use as much or as little of the appropriated funds 
it deemed necessary and put forth three arguments: (1) that the 
pilot program did not intend “to feed large numbers of persons in 
the designated categories of beneficiaries but rather to assemble 
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medical data which will enable Congress to evaluate the worth of 
the program;” (2) that experts had advised the department that the 
program required only six million dollars per year, not twenty; 
and (3) that no funds earmarked for fiscal year 1973 could car-
ry over to 1974.10 The Supreme Court disagreed on every score. 
Believing that Congress intended the program both to assemble 
medical information and feed the hungry, it cited how the com-
pulsory language denied the Secretary of Agriculture his share of 
discretion. In particular, since “Congress intended to make forty 
million dollars available for the Section 17 program until its expi-
ration on June 30, 1974… this intent cannot be frustrated by delay 
in implementation.”11 Speaking for the hungry, the Court ordered 
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to spend all of the money Con-
gress appropriated before the pilot program expired in 1974. 
 Because the court ruled against the USDA in Dotson v. 
Butz, many historians and journalists tend to obscure the USDA’s 
rationale, instead opting to sensationalize the Department’s delay. 
The arguments that the USDA put forth are, however, rather com-
pelling. The Department’s contention that the medical research 
aspect of the program superseded the feeding component might 
sound nefarious and underhanded and has been portrayed as such 
in the historiography, but the USDA’s reasoning was actually 
quite sound and informed many of the USDA’s decisions about 
the pilot. The legislation authorized a pilot program that would pro-
vide the Congress with
[s]ufficient medical data to medically identify and define 
the benefits provided through this program in combatting 
and abating any physical and mental damage that otherwise 
might be caused to infants due to malnutrition; and to make 
recommendations to the Congress on the wisdom and prac-
ticality of legislation for a more permanent and widespread 
program.12 
The language here certainly suggests that the pilot program’s re-
search component subordinated the feeding aspect, particularly 
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the clause about a “more permanent and widespread program” 
after the pilot program’s efficacy had been established. During the 
congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Clay-
ton K. Yeutter justified the alleged delay by citing the research 
component. He argued that the Department “proceeded with care 
and thoroughness in order to produce a sound pilot” that would 
provide “the full scientific evaluation that Congress intended.”13 
USDA officials did not want to spend all twenty million dollars 
because they believed that a smaller program would have bet-
ter structure and scientific credibility than a dispersed, grandiose 
project. Yeutter responded to congressional criticism: “There is 
no point in spending $40 million if the job can be done with $10 
million…it was a pilot program and was not intended to feed all 
the needy children in the United States; it was a pilot program 
designed to learn answers to some very important questions.”14
 Even activists who fully supported the WIC program and 
criticized the USDA’s management agreed that the legislation’s 
dual purpose complicated the program’s execution. Dr. David 
Paige, a witness whom Senator Humphrey brought forward to de-
nounce the USDA, admitted that obtaining sufficient medical data 
could not be “tied to a mass social experiment” and that a suc-
cessful medical experiment pivoted on “valid scientific method-
ology.”15 The smaller program that the USDA envisioned would 
have the experimental validity that a widespread, dispersed food 
program lacked. In a report before Congress, the Food and Nutri-
tion Service (FNS), the subdivision of the Agriculture Department 
in charge of the WIC program, concluded that the “practical effect 
of this [Dotson v. Butz] ruling was to considerably expand the 
WIC program beyond the modest pilot project USDA-FNS had 
planned.”16 Essentially, the USDA believed its smaller project ad-
hered to the express intent of the law much more than Congress’s 
imagined program and that potential beneficiaries were rushing 
a careful process. According to social and political scientists 
Bertram M. Gross and Michael Marienargue, “one of the most 
baffling difficulties in applying the test [pilot] approach to social 
problems” is that “the announcement of pilot projects to be under-
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taken in a few selected areas usually creates demands of ‘spread 
the money more equitably’ from those without project money.”17 
The USDA believed that the WIC program suffered from this dif-
ficulty: while the USDA tried to create a viable social experiment, 
politicians and activists clamored prematurely for the expenditure 
of funds. Whether USDA officials genuinely believed that the re-
search component superseded the food distribution aspect or just 
cleverly misconstrued congressional intent is hard to say. None-
theless, the USDA’s reasoning—as anti-USDA witnesses grudg-
ingly admitted—was valid. The research component and trial-run 
nature of the pilot made the USDA’s small project economical, 
responsible, and reasonable, even if it did not feed all of the needy 
children in America. 
 Criticism of the USDA’s implementation also concen-
trated on the USDA’s prioritization of the nation’s farmers at the 
expense of pregnant women and their babies. Much anti-hunger 
rhetoric focused on the paradox of plenty. Senator McGovern 
opined that “to have billions spent to stop food from being grown 
and finance surplus storage while other Americans languish under 
the blight of malnutrition” disturbed Americans’ sense of fairness 
and logic.18 Even more explicitly, Humphrey maintained that the 
USDA had prioritized expenditures without regard for congres-
sional law, easily doling out “a bonanza of about $500 million…
to wheat farms” when Congress and the USDA had wrangled over 
the WIC program—“a $20 million program”—for over a year.”19 
He drew attention to the Department’s wheat subsidies to under-
score his argument that the USDA made deliberate decisions to 
undermine the success of WIC. As he observed cynically, “The 
Department could not find the time, nor the means, nor the man-
power, nor the will, to initiate a $20 million program…It just de-
pends on what you want to do around this town, apparently, to see 
what gets done. Apparently, the infant and the mother take second 
place to many others.”20
 Humphrey’s accusations present a grain of truth. Secre-
tary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson established the USDA prior-
ity in the early 1960s when he explained: “We [the USDA] are 
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most sympathetic to the plight of the needy persons. We must, 
however, not lose sight of the fact that the primary responsibility 
of the Department is to carry out the farm programs that benefit 
the farmer.”21 Alongside this explicit confession of the USDA’s 
priorities, the Nixon administration admitted plans to separate the 
Department of Agriculture from all non-farmer related issues like 
food welfare by creating a Department of Human Resources and/
or a Department of Community Development. Coupled with the 
fact that the USDA spent five months in negotiations with the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) about pass-
ing on responsibility for WIC, Congress was justifiably suspicious 
of the USDA’s dedication. Senator Charles H. Percy (R-IL) ques-
tioned Yeutter extensively about the Department’s commitment to 
food programs in this context and asked the Assistant Secretary if 
the USDA planned to foist off food programs to DHEW while the 
administration pressed for new departments. Yeutter responded 
that the commitment to food programs would not and could not 
be higher in any other department, even if food programs were 
not “exactly in the direct line of [the USDA’s] overall major thrust 
and responsibility.”22
 Yeutter’s statements exacerbated the problem rather than 
quelling concerns. Though Yeutter assured Congress that the 
USDA’s commitment was unwavering, he had admitted that the 
USDA had wrangled with the DHEW about “who within the U.S. 
government would carry the lead role, whether it would be DHEW 
or USDA.” He even identified these negotiations as the “principal 
segment of the delay.”23 With this confession, critics argued that 
USDA clearly wanted to run away from the program. This con-
demnation forced the USDA on the defensive, and they spun the 
story otherwise. According to a FNS report, the USDA’s delay in 
executing the project was purely pragmatic. The USDA argued 
that its limited capacities precluded the proper administration of 
the medical side of WIC and that DHEW had more experience 
with such a program: “Congress required a medical evaluation 
of the Special Supplemental Food Program and…the Department 
of Agriculture was not organized to carry out this type of techni-
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cal study.”24 After the DHEW refused to undertake the endeavor, 
however, “the Department of Agriculture proceeded to set up the 
mechanisms to implement the program and the medical evalu-
ation.”25 The USDA’s presentation of the facts differed grossly 
from that of those members of Congress who suspected ulterior 
motives for the department’s dawdling. From the USDA’s por-
trayal, the department was merely seeking out the best venue for 
the program and the moment USDA officials realized that their 
department was the only one for the job, they drafted a viable 
program. Yeutter claimed that DHEW only “concluded that they 
should not play the key role in [the] program” in February of 1973, 
but that since February, USDA officials had been “very actively 
involved…in determining all the parameters of the program, de-
veloping the regulations for proceeding, and so on.”26 According 
to the USDA, the primary reason for delay was its limited ca-
pacity. This argument, though eloquent and clever, proves to be 
the USDA’s weakest because the USDA had already carried out a 
food supplement program for women, infants, and children with 
a medical research component. In fact, the results of that project 
informed the USDA’s attitude toward WIC and truly accounted 
for its reluctance to execute the program. 
 During the Johnson Administration, in 1968, Secretary of 
Agriculture Orville Freeman led a small supplemental food pro-
gram that distributed, above the food stamp allowance, surplus 
cereals, juices, milk, corn syrup, canned vegetables, and protein 
foods to expectant and postpartum mothers and their children.27 
Because of the high distribution costs of a commodities-based 
project, the USDA initiated a voucher system pilot. The Depart-
ment contracted with Dr. David Call of Cornell University “to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the program” in Bibb County, Geor-
gia, and Chicago, Illinois.28 The results of the evaluation were dis-
appointing. Dr. Call found that the program “had little or no nu-
tritional impact” and that “overall the participants who used food 
certificates on top of food stamps fared no better nutritionally than 
did those relying on food stamps alone to better their diets.”29 The 
Department concluded that the supplemental program failed to 
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better the target population’s nutrition because there was no way 
to ensure that the food went only to mother and child, instead of 
the entire household. Yeutter explained to Senator Humphrey at 
the congressional hearing:
The experience with the Supplemental Food Program is that 
when those commodities have been made available they 
have not gone, in many cases, to the member of the family 
that should consume them. They have either been consumed 
by someone else in the family or they have not been con-
sumed at all….the family may merely change its expenditure 
pattern. The increase that occurs by virtue of these products 
being made available results in a decrease elsewhere and the 
total nutrient consumption changes little and perhaps none 
at all.30
Thus, the USDA officials decided their efforts would yield better 
results if they focused on bettering the entire family’s nutritional 
well-being by using food stamps, rather than focusing on indi-
vidual members of the family. Historian Peter K. Eisinger sees 
this failed experiment as the watershed in USDA-Congress rela-
tions on the issue of alleviating hunger in America. The USDA’s 
doubts and delays stemmed from “the belief that WIC was inef-
fective and unnecessary.”31 Although Congress insisted that pro-
grams like WIC were already in effect and effective, the USDA 
had already come to its own conclusions: targeted programs did 
not work. Consequently, the Department committed itself instead 
to expanding the Food Stamp Program and other family assis-
tance programs.32 This move explains why the early 1970s saw a 
number of complications with the WIC program, yet an expansion 
of federal responsibility for the funding and the geographic scope 
of the Food Stamp Program.
 The battle over the WIC program did not recede after the 
USDA finally implemented it. Congress worked to expand the 
program aggressively and the Nixon administration scrambled to 
keep the budget balanced. The USDA and Congress each saw the 
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other as the villain. The USDA thought Congress wasted taxpay-
ers’ money on an untenably expensive program, and Congress 
and anti-hunger activists portrayed the USDA as a bureaucracy 
of insensitive, miserly baby-haters. Only one side of the story has 
survived, likely because, in the end, Congress “won.” The winner 
writes the history book, and in this case, the USDA lost its voice 
on the issue of the WIC pilot. 
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rural race relations 
 Stretching from northern New England to southern Geor-
gia, the Appalachian Mountains have historically marked the 
geographical boundary between the East Coast and the Midwest-
ern United States. A vast, unsettled frontier in early America, the 
Appalachians became an immigrant-based buffer between polite 
society and Native Americans. Confined by the geographical 
restrictions their rugged terrain imposed, these mountain immi-
grants created unique, homogeneous communities that remained 
virtually untouched by the increasing modernization of the United 
States. These homogenized societies were, and continue to be, 
comprised predominately of white Protestants whose ancestors 
may be found in family graveyards dating back generations. Un-
like the majority of the southern United States, the southern Ap-
palachians lacked the significant African American presence that 
contributed to the diversification and “multitiered society their 
presence imposed on the rest of the South.”1 This demographical 
void created a white racial “innocence” that in turn allowed Ap-
palachian society to develop a unique form of protective racism 
different from other regions of the American South.
 First settled during the eighteenth century, the Blue Ridge 
section of the Appalachian Mountains offered affordable tracts of 
land to Ulster Scots, Germans, and a few English settlers. In an at-
tempt to escape their strict Quaker leaders and the increasing lack 
of mobility in the Chesapeake, these immigrants coped with the 
uncertainties of “backcountry” life by forming tightly knit, yet re-
mote, communities. Shared experiences, high mortality rates, and 
rampant poverty fostered a mountain society with intense moral, 
religious, political, and social values.
 As population crowding in the Chesapeake and Tidewa-
ter escalated, westward migration began to move further into the 
Appalachians. Communities began to form small towns as agri-
Rebekah Turnmire
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cultural ventures became more profitable. Though many Appala-
chian families were subsistence farmers, a few were successful 
in building and maintaining larger farms, becoming prosperous 
members of mountain society. Emulating many successful farm-
ers of the South, some even reached the financial affluence neces-
sary to purchase a substantial number of slaves to work the fields.2 
In areas like Grayson County, Virginia, these slaveholders appear 
to have become the most prominent families in their respective 
regions of the county, theoretically monopolizing and controlling 
slavery in the area.3 Throughout the onslaught of the Civil War, 
mountain sensibilities towards outsiders and the aforementioned 
sparse biracial variation became prominent forces in evolving 
race relations of Appalachian communities. 
 In his piece “Mountain Victory,” William Faulkner illus-
trates mountaineer wariness of outsiders and the macabre results 
of the sudden “exposure to members of a second race.”4 Set in 
the backwoods of Tennessee in the years immediately following 
the Civil War, Faulkner details a white Appalachian family’s first 
encounter with a black man. Skeptically welcoming in a Confed-
erate major and his African American body servant who are jour-
neying back to the major’s Mississippi plantation, this frontier 
family is taken aback by the stark difference in the pair’s respec-
tive skin tones. Fascination turns into distrust, fear, and hatred as 
one of the daughters becomes attracted to the Confederate major. 
Though Faulkner’s tale comes to a bitter end with the slaying of 
the major, his black companion, and, accidently, the youngest son, 
his depiction of the family’s reaction to seeing a black man for the 
first time illustrates the sort of “racial innocence” that character-
ized similar secluded mountain regions for subsequent decades.5 
Just as Faulkner’s short story reflects upon and tries to explain the 
racial hostility of the Appalachian family towards their visitors, a 
different account of interdependence depicts the bi-racial depen-
dence of white families on their slaves during the war. 
 Recalling a family legend, Joe W. Phipps of Grayson 
County, Virginia, spoke of several incidents when his great-
grandmother’s reliance on a few of the family’s slaves kept their 
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farm running while her husband was fighting for the Confederacy. 
Common during the Civil War, raids on nearby farms and home-
steads by various Yankee and Confederate regiments frequently 
left families without food, supplies, and other goods needed to 
survive during harsh times. Frequently in proximity to Yankee en-
campments, the Phipps homestead and other neighboring farms 
fell victim to several small raids. One such incident would have 
decimated the Phipps’ winter food supply had it not been for the 
aid of the Phipps family slaves. With the matriarch of the family 
gone to Dublin, Virginia, to deliver knitted socks and gloves to 
a Confederate regiment there, the young children and farm were 
left in the care of their slaves. Hearing of a Yankee raid up the 
road, several of the Phipps’ slaves hid the cured hogs meat un-
der the floorboards of the abandoned blacksmith’s shop down the 
road. As Mr. Phipps explained, his great-grandmother’s trust of 
her slaves increased dramatically, and though her dependence on 
them to keep the farm functioning throughout the war was great, 
after that specific raid she became more fiercely protective of 
them. 
 Although this particular family narrative probably con-
tains a few embellished elements, the underlying theme of code-
pendence may explain the more lenient treatment of slaves by 
their Appalachian masters.6 Consequently, it may have also been 
one of the catalysts for slaves to enter into a form of sharecrop-
ping with their former masters at the conclusion of the Civil War. 
The mountain slaves who elected to remain in the area and work 
on the farms of former masters were granted tracts of land for 
their own purposes. Descendants of these former slaves continue 
to live and work in the counties their ancestors had come to in 
bondage.
 Though black families married and had children in these 
mountain communities, racial demographics indicate that the Ap-
palachian Mountains remained persistently white; whole counties 
were frequently devoid of African Americans. Those counties that 
did had extremely small populations that resided in separate areas 
of the counties. For instance, in both Grayson County, Virginia, 
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and Ashe County, North Carolina, black families congregated in 
small, all black sections of towns.7 Many mountaineers colloqui-
ally referred to these sectors as “darky town” and “colored town.”8
 Traditionally, race relations in the American South have 
been characterized by the events and actions of whites in the Deep 
South. Though warranted, historians’ focus on these affairs leaves 
out an important aspect of regional race relations in southern his-
tory. Unlike regions in the Deep South and urban centers in the 
Upper South, the interactions between blacks and whites in the 
Appalachians have been sorely disregarded. The assumption that 
there was no racial intermingling in remote areas has fostered an 
image of intense, overt racism and ignorance by poor mountain 
whites. As I found through interviews with residents, this was and 
is most certainly not the case.
 Grayson County, Virginia, is nestled deep within the Blue 
Ridge section of the Appalachian Mountains. Formed in 1793, 
Grayson County as of the 2000 census boasts a population of 
roughly 18,000 people, 6.7% of which are African American.9 
Both the white and black portions of the county are comprised 
of descendants of the immigrants and slave families who origi-
nally settled there. Four hundred forty-six square miles in area, 
the population of Grayson is spread out with small “pocket” com-
munities sprinkled throughout the different sections. Similar to 
other Appalachian counties, Grayson’s lack of population density 
and geographical seclusion created a spectrum of racial contact 
throughout the county. For certain residents of Grayson County, 
from an early age their contact and intimacy with members of the 
black community were acute. Inter-racial experience in Appala-
chian areas like Grayson County relied heavily on several factors: 
family occupation and affluence, geography of area in which they 
lived, and proximity to town center.  
 Born in 1926, Joe W. Phipps grew up in the Fox Creek 
section of Grayson County. The Phipps clan, one of the original 
families in the area, had been affluent farmers during and after 
the American Civil War. One of the only families in the county to 
own slaves, they continued to employe their black workers long 
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after slavery had ended. As a child, Joe Phipps would hoe corn 
alongside the black workers his father and grandfather employed 
to work the fields. Like many other white families, his mother 
also employed a maid to help do household chores and keep the 
children. Living “down in the holler” from the Phipps homestead, 
the members of the black community in the Fox Creek area were 
all in some way connected with the Phipps farm, walking and 
working there every day.10 Though their ties were strong, the lives 
of those black workers and the Phipps family were still distinctly 
separate.
 Unlike the fields where Joe Phipps worked alongside 
his black neighbors, he never worshiped or attended school with 
their children. On a three hundred acre piece of land given to for-
mer slave Uncle Reed Cox, Joe Phipps’ father and grandfather 
cleared a small portion to build Uncle Reed a church and school. 
This multi-functional building served as a “colored-school” for 
the black community in Fox Creek. Instead of attending Bridle 
Creek, the local school Joe Phipps went to as a child, the “little 
black boys had to walk down to his [Uncle Reed’s] school” in-
stead.11 This institutionalized separation and distinction of black 
and white children who otherwise played together psychologi-
cally enforced a social precedent for “knowing one’s place.”
 Similarly, Rex Halsey, another Grayson County na-
tive, grew up in a family that employed black workers. Like Joe 
Phipps’ mother, Rex Halsey’s mother employed a black woman, 
Ms. Lenny Grimmes, who lived in another small “black village” 
down the road. Ms. Lenny helped his mother do house work and 
care for the children. Remembered as a fine lady they “thought 
the world of [her]. She was so kind and good to [us], just anything 
[we] wanted she would try to make it happen [for us].”12 In this in-
nocent comment there are possessive undertones as if Ms. Lenny 
were something to which he, as a child, was entitled. Unintention-
ally, Mr. Halsey’s recollections of Ms. Lenny were reminiscent of 
a grandchild speaking of a beloved grandmother yet his depiction 
of her brings to mind the black mammies of Southern literature 
and cinema. Her memory begins to resemble white stereotypes 
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of black housemaids. Such stereotypical descriptions are not sin-
gular to Appalachian regions as they crop up throughout white 
Southern memory, literature, and music.
 Common throughout Appalachian history, it was rare to 
see a black community in the western-most, and usually more 
mountainous, regions of Appalachian counties. Unlike Joe Phipps 
and Rex Halsey, Mildred Anderson, born in Grant, Virginia, in 
1924, spent the formative years of her life having never encoun-
tered an African American. Her first racial interaction came as a 
teenager while her family still lived in Grant, Virginia. Having 
only heard stories of “mulattos” as a child, she and her sisters 
were bewildered when two black men visited her family’s farm. 
Driving their white employers cattle to market, they had stopped 
to enlist the services of her father and his cattle scales. Due to 
the remote location of their home and the lateness of the day, her 
father invited the two men to stay the night. An anomaly in her 
secluded way of life, the men’s dark complexions peaked the curi-
osity of Mrs. Anderson and her sisters. She described their “fasci-
nation [to be] so great that [they] could not wait to check and see 
if the sheets were still white the next morning.”13 What seems to 
be a peculiar inquisition illustrates a far tamer racial “innocence” 
than the gruesome affair Faulkner describes in “Mountain Vic-
tory.” Having had no previous contact with the opposite race, the 
differences in skin tone confused Mildred Anderson’s understand-
ing of the world in which she lived. Yet this racial naivety does 
not accurately reflect all racial interactions between mountain 
people and their black neighbors.
 Dona Cox, a ninety-nine-year-old resident of Grayson 
County, lived in the neighboring county of Wytheville, Virginia, 
for a short period of time before moving to Independence, Vir-
ginia. While in Wytheville, she employed a black maid to help her 
with household duties and her then small children. Greta, Mrs. 
Cox’s black maid, had been a lifetime resident of Wytheville and 
had extensive household experience. Dona Cox described Greta’s 
state during the maid’s initial interview as a precarious one. Bat-
tling with alcoholism, Greta had previously had trouble staying 
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employed after she was released from prison in her early twenties. 
A then-wary Mrs. Cox hired her on a strictly trial basis. Becoming 
rather reliant on Greta as her family grew, Mrs. Cox and her maid 
grew intimate, trusting each other enough to divulge a multitude 
of life experiences. Later in her employment, Greta described ear-
lier episodes of her particularly unsavory past to Mrs. Cox:
 As a pre-teenager [Greta] had been employed in a rather 
large home at which, every day at noon, she was required to 
carry lunch to the master of the house’s white workers who 
worked in the field. As part of that daily ritual some of them 
would take her to the barn and molest her. Finally having 
enough and wanting to get out of her degrading situation, 
she ran away very early one morning and fled to Cincinnati 
where she found work in another large home that already 
employed two African Americans, a butler and a cook. Hav-
ing fallen in love with the cook, they planned to marry once 
they had enough money to make it on their own. 
 Sadly, being a very beautiful girl, the master of the house 
had fallen in love with her too. When she resisted his ad-
vances, the master grew angry and murdered the cook with 
a butcher knife. A prominent man in the community, he told 
Greta that ‘because she was black she therefore did not stand 
a chance of being free from what he was going to accuse her 
of.’ Due to his status in the community he offered her $2000 
to take the blame and promised to insure she would only 
be sentenced to two years in jail, after which she would be 
free.14
Though the events of Greta’s struggles have been passed down 
orally and, for that reason, altered somewhat, the pervasive need 
to protect her black maid is apparent in the disgust with which 
Mrs. Cox describes Greta’s past and the loving tones which coat 
her discussion of their time together. Much like an overprotective 
parent, Mrs. Cox seems to mistrust any outsiders who potentially 
may have hurt “her Greta.”
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 A similar paternalistic responsibility towards hired hands 
is also apparent in a trip Rex Halsey took later in life with his fa-
ther’s black truck driver Clarence Valentine. Living in the “black 
village” down the road, Mr. Valentine worked for Mr. Halsey’s 
father for roughly twenty-two years. In December of 1957, his 
father’s cousin, who owned an apartment complex in Florida, 
needed a shipment of lump coal to be brought down from Vir-
ginia. At the height of Southern segregation, it was unsafe for Mr. 
Halsey’s father to send Clarence to Florida unaccompanied; Mr. 
Halsey, being young and unmarried at the time, volunteered to ac-
company the convoy of coal southward. Detailing the atmosphere 
of their journey to Florida, Mr. Halsey described the overt racism 
they combated. Most restaurants and gas stations supported little 
white signs reading “White Patrons Only,” or racially-designated 
entrances. Not used to such treatment, Mr. Valentine frequently 
chose to remain in the car hungry instead of having to be turned 
away. It appears that Mr. Halsey and his cousin made it quite clear 
at each restaurant at which they stopped that “there was a black 
man in [the] station wagon and the owner was to take him a tray 
to the car. Otherwise, their business would go elsewhere.”15 Mr. 
Halsey makes it apparent that this particular incident was not iso-
lated as both his family and Clarence continued to face the harsh 
segregation of the lower South on other delivery trips. Yet, as Mr. 
Halsey stressed, “having grown up with blacks, [he] saw no rea-
son for there to be any bad blood.”16
 As the Civil Rights Movement began to take hold of the 
nation and mandatory integration was instituted, mountain areas 
like Grayson County experienced little overt backlash from the 
white community. It appears that integration of the Grayson pub-
lic schools happened almost flawlessly. Perhaps this smooth tran-
sition resulted from a significantly small number of black children 
who were required to attend the white schools or the “lack of ill 
will” Mr. Halsey described. Regardless of the reason, the absence 
of any documented or remembered problems makes one question 
whether malicious feelings were being repressed or whether there 
was a lack of contention not present in other regions.
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 A testament to inter-racial kindness in Grayson County, 
Julia Valentine moved to this county shortly before de-segregation 
hit the western portion of Virginia. Previously teaching in Tennes-
see, Mrs. Valentine had been commuting from her home in Bris-
tol, Virginia, to work in Knoxville, Tennessee. When a job opened 
at the colored school in Bridle Creek as an elementary school 
teacher she quickly accepted the position as a way to be closer 
to her family and save money. A gifted teacher, Mrs. Valentine’s 
tenure at the colored school was quite successful, even catching 
the eye of the county superintendent. When Grayson County had 
to integrate he offered her a position at the elementary school in 
Independence as the first African American teacher in the county. 
Wary at first, Mrs. Valentine discussed the possible consequences 
of teaching white students in a predominately white institution 
with her husband Oscar. Accepting on a probationary period of a 
year, Mrs. Valentine made it clear that “there was never any op-
position, or none that [my husband] or I heard, to my being black 
and teaching mostly white students.”17 Both Mrs. Valentine and 
her husband, a Grayson County native, explicitly commented on 
the “friendly relations between races” and, what they perceived, 
as a “lack of racial distinction” in general.18 Mr. Valentine pas-
sionately avowed his assurance that had there been any problems, 
they would have been taken care of by many of the white com-
munity leaders with whom he had grown up: “If [he] had heard of 
an issue [he] could have spoken to one of [his] friends and they 
would have thoroughly taken care of it.”19 A hint of confrontation 
in his tone, Mr. Valentine’s lecture on wonderful race relations in 
the county became a dogged need to reaffirm his lifelong associa-
tion with and almost familial ties to the white families he grew up 
around. Contrary to Mr. and Mrs. Valentine’s fond experiences, 
Brenda Horton of Ashe County, North Carolina, had a very differ-
ent integration experience. 
 Ashe County neighbors Grayson County to the south and, 
with a very similar demographic, is equally remote and isolated. 
Born in 1950 Brenda Horton lived in a small all-black village 15 
minutes outside of Jefferson for a large portion of her life. Hav-
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ing first attended the colored school in Jefferson, North Carolina, 
she was 16 when North Carolina schools were integrated. Forced 
to attend Ashe Central High School in Jefferson, Brenda was one 
of six black students from her village that went to Ashe Central. 
Having never ridden a desegregated bus before, she was quite ner-
vous about her first experience. No stranger to overt racism, rid-
ing the integrated school bus with her white peers for the first time 
was a small introduction to the harsh realities of Ashe Central. 
Her recollection of that first bus ride is one of teenage degrada-
tion: “If [she] tried to sit with a white student they would jump 
into the aisle before [she] could get into the seat, as if [she] had 
lice or some sort of disease.”20 On her first day, “[we] pulled up in 
front of the school and they had ‘big shots’ to take each one of us 
around.”21 As she was led around the facilities white students and 
other community members were “lined all up and down on both 
sides of the hall. We would hear them say that ‘N’ word as we 
walked by. We would be sitting in the classroom and they would 
call us that ‘N’ word.”22 It appears to have been the poor white 
students who were the worst, moving away from black students 
in the classroom, throwing spitballs at them, making racist com-
ments. The lack of administrative action against blatant incidents 
of harassment, daily debasement and humiliation, and feelings 
of hopelessness caused Brenda to drop out of Ashe Central four 
months later. The lack of protective alliance in the Jefferson sec-
tion of Ashe County is more reminiscent of similar experiences of 
black students in urban centers in Appalachia.
 In a dual memoir of race in Appalachia, William Drennen 
Jr. and Kojo Jones recount the trials and tribulations of coming of 
age in the South Hills section of Charleston, West Virginia, dur-
ing the 1950s. Their different experiences reflect their respective 
places in the racial hierarchy of South Hills. As a rather affluent 
white child, William Drennen’s reflections on and experiences 
with race relations growing up are disconnected, becoming more 
of an afterthought. Drennen recalls that his preoccupations grow-
ing up were of girls, sports, school, and friends and rarely, if ever, 
did those thoughts directly center upon race. He grew up barely 
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aware that the differences between the two races “had created a 
gulf that would require Moses to cross.”23 Though Drennen had 
interacted with African Americans from an early age he had rarely 
been allowed to play with or intimately interact with black chil-
dren.
 Unlike Drennen, Kojo Jones’ life in South Hills seemed 
always to be a reaction to his white neighbors. What he terms 
“THE black experience” were the realities of unspoken racial 
boundaries that could not be crossed without the threat of “serious 
injury, if not loss of life.”24 Lessons in navigating a white-domi-
nated world were “reported by brothers as well as black mothers 
and grandmothers who worked in and took care of white peoples’ 
homes.”25 As Kojo’s experiences taught him, for the “black peo-
ple [of Charleston] every movement was in some way a reflection 
of or a reaction to the color of their skin.”26 Desegregation and 
integration did not necessarily mean cooperation or friendly ties 
in both Appalachian urban centers and her rural counties. 
 Though the side effects of integration varied from county 
to county, public schools in the Appalachians were not the only 
institutions effected. In the Mouth of Wilson region of Grayson 
County, Oak Hill Academy, a small private, Baptist boarding 
school had to navigate the waters of integration in a much differ-
ent fashion. A transplant into the community, Ed Patton started 
working at Oak Hill Academy in 1967. After the mandatory inte-
gration of Southern public schools, the still-segregated Oak Hill 
received a surge of white students from areas further south whose 
parents were attempting to flee from the integrated institutions in 
their areas. Fearing African American influence, parents sought 
out the private school as a perceived haven for white supremacy.27
 Oak Hill’s integration, unlike many public institutions, 
was carefully thought out and planned with the utmost sensitiv-
ity. Mr. Patton, who was Dean of Students at that time, worked 
with much of the faculty to talk to and counsel current students 
about how they were to behave and interact prior to admitting Oak 
Hill’s first black student. The backlash of Oak Hill’s integration 
was most noticeable in the immediate drop in enrollment and loss 
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of certain financial backers. The surrounding community’s reac-
tion mirrored that of some of the school’s students. Traditionally 
a Baptist institution, Oak Hill’s students were required to attend 
church services with the nearby congregation at Young’s Chapel 
Baptist Church. Under the same obligations as white students, 
newly admitted black students began to attend church services 
as well. As a result, certain local members of Young’s Chapel left 
the church, refusing to worship alongside African Americans.28 
Though the majority of members continued to attend, the initial 
drop in membership challenges the assumption that every white 
resident in Grayson County was completely racially accepting.
 Race relations in the Appalachian Mountains should not 
be immediately characterized by the traditional stereotype of ho-
mogenous white ignorant racism. Instead, it should be carefully 
examined through the various types of interactions and experienc-
es mountain people had. Living in remote, isolated areas seems to 
have fostered unique types of race relations. As seen in Grayson 
County, Virginia, close proximity and intimate connections from 
early childhood gave way to an intrinsic “owner-pet” relation-
ship between whites and blacks. Exposure played a major role 
in racial views and stereotypical perceptions. Yet the conception 
of racial innocence may be too simplistic of a generalization for 
many bi-racial interactions in the Appalachian South, though its 
importance to the understanding of white mountaineer reactions 
to race is still prevalent. Perhaps it was the small black demo-
graphic that lessened the threat that some whites felt or the inti-
mate relationship from an early age for some that created more ra-
cially accepting communities. The type of white protective racism 
observed in Grayson County cannot act as the primary example of 
ALL racial interactions in the Appalachian south. As seen through 
Brenda Hampton’s experiences in Ashe County, North Carolina, 
some rural circumstances more closely resembled those experi-
ences detailed in William Drennen and Kojo Jones’ Red, White, 
Black & Blue. Regardless of location it is evident throughout the 
Appalachians that both white and black “grew up in a society 
where [one did not] question [racial] differences.”29 Though these 
48
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol4/iss1/1
Turnmire rural race relaTions 49
secluded Appalachian regions were not completely devoid of rac-
ism, it seems to have manifested in watered down undertones of 
protective racism.
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trembling before the camel: 
     Popular Religion and the Sunni ‘Ulama’ at the 
     Periphery of Islam
“On the day [the scholars] left Timbuktu you could see grown 
men with beards anxious to mount a camel, but trembling in fear 
before it. When they mounted the camel, they were thrown off 
when the beast rose, for the righteous forefathers used to keep 
their children indoors until they grew up. Hence they had no un-
derstanding of practical matters, since they did not play in their 
youth, and play makes a child smart and gives him insight into 
many things.”
—Al-Sa‘di, Ta’rikh al-Sudan, ch. 121
“Inasmuch as the increase of temporal duties has thrown a veil 
over his world-illuminating spiritual beauty, it was not everyone 
who could bring far-sighted intelligence to the point of under-
standing His Majesty [Akbar], and there was a bustling market 
of inappreciation. Especially this was so with paper-worshipping 
scholiasts, sunk in the mire of routine, and recognizing no 
knowledge except the garnering of old materials and market-
worn beads of small value and writings in ancient folios which 
had been fabricated by servile decorators.”
—Abu al-Fazl, Akbarnama, vol. III, ch. 472
 It has been almost sixty years since the Islamicist Ber-
nard Lewis remarked that the great innovation of twentieth-cen-
tury Western scholarship—in contrast to previous epochs—was 
its interest in broad-based economic and social change, attempt-
ing to break down the elite cloister in which the discipline had 
been housed for centuries and reforming it along more inclusive 
lines.3 As the study of Islamic history pushes further into the 
twenty-first century, Lewis’s remarks still ring true as ever. In the 
Robin Crigler
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intervening decades, scholars such as John Berkey, Colin Imber, 
and Ahmed Karamustafa have diligently probed the historical 
record for insights into the often-obscured hand of “popular 
religion” (as it is, somewhat crassly, termed), and have made 
many contributions to historians’ understanding of the dynamism 
of Muslim societies and the ever-changing nature of “orthodoxy” 
within them.4 These works admonish students of seeking hard 
and unchanging categories of thought and group in Muslim soci-
eties and to analyze written accounts—particularly those of the 
scholarly community, or ‘ulama’—with a grain of salt.
 Despite their self-professed interest in “thick descrip-
tion,” such writers have struck upon different ways of con-
ceiving the broad contours of Islamic history.“ Since the 13th 
century,” argues Lewis, “the religious history of Middle Eastern 
Islam has been chiefly concerned with the interplay of dogmatic 
religion and popular piety”—the latter of which he conflates 
with Sufism.5 Set alongside battles over taqlid (tradition), Ber-
key seems to agree, while Henderson instead sees Sufism as a 
“sort of religious Rorschach test,” conducive to neither blanket 
condemnation nor unqualified acceptance from religious elites.6 
Madeline Zilfi’s portrait of the Kadizadeli movement in seven-
teenth-century Istanbul goes still further in reconceptualizing the 
Islamic intellectual mainstream as a contested space to which 
various economic and social groups aspired (Sufis against low 
level mosque-preachers, in the Kadizadeli case), granting agency 
to people instead of ideologies or academic principles.7
 This social approach, while undoubtedly fruitful, has 
unfortunately been focused almost exclusively on the modern 
“Middle East”—an arbitrary section of territory stretching from 
Istanbul and the Nile River valley east to the old frontiers of 
Safavid Persia—cutting off several large and influential swathes 
of the Islamic world, such as modern India, North Africa, Indo-
nesia, and the Swahili Coast. The reasons for this exclusion are 
likely diverse, having as much to do with the legacy of European 
imperialism as simple unfamiliarity, in an academy where the 
task of an Islamic specialist and a scholar of the Middle East are 
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all too rarely distinguished.
 This paper seeks to shed light on this neglected area by 
focusing on the relationship between crown, turban, and masses 
in two contexts: that of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Songhay 
in the western Sudan (modern day Mali) and that of sixteenth-
century Mughal India under the reign of Akbar the Great. While 
at first glance the two cases may seem widely disparate, in fact 
they share many important similarities through the lens of Islam-
ic history. Both empires were indebted to the pan-hemispheric 
era of Renaissance ushered in by the end of the Black Death by 
the beginning of the fifteenth century; both empires became hubs 
of culture and learning in their respective regions. Both empires 
also shared the distinction of being on the marches of the Islamic 
world, far away from traditional centers of Islamic authority, and 
in both empires Sunni Muslim monarchs held dominion over a 
population that remained mostly unconverted despite centuries 
of contact with Islam.
 This last point is an important one in distinguishing 
Mughal Hindustan and Songhay from  the Muslim territories of 
the Middle East. While authors like Ira Lapidus and Karamustafa 
rightly emphasize the length of time it took for a Muslim major-
ity to arise in territories conquered by the Rashidun caliphs and 
the Ottomans, in India no Islamic dynasty was ever successful 
in rendering Muslims as any more than an elite minority, despite 
periodically persecuting Hindus and holding sovereignty in 
northern India in various forms as early as 711; Sikandar Lodi, 
for example—sultan of Delhi in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies—is said to have killed 15,000 Hindus in one day as a dem-
onstration of his faith.8 Likewise, in western Sudan and Sahelian 
Africa, “the emergence of overtly practicing Muslim majorities” 
did not occur until the rise of the Sokoto caliphate and the jihadi 
(holy war) movements of the nineteenth century.9 While the 
specific factors at play in the African case lie outside the realm 
of this article, it is difficult to overstate the regional importance 
of such large and wealthy polities, as well as their uniqueness in 
relation to the Islamic metropole.
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 The story of the Mughal dynasty in Hindustan tradition-
ally begins with the remarkable careers of Chengiz Khan, Timur-
i-Lang (“Tamburlaine”), and their followers, who swept through 
Persia eastward from central Asia in the early thirteenth and late 
fourteenth centuries, respectively. Both periods of invasion were 
tremendously jarring for the Muslims, many of whom found 
themselves subject to these newly-converted nomads from the 
central Asian steppes.10 Some of the dynasties that resulted from 
these tumults developed a sophisticated court culture but most 
were plagued by political strife and rarely lasted more than a 
couple of generations. In 1504 Akbar’s grandfather Babur (who 
claimed descent from Chingiz Khan) led one of many warring 
factions of Timurid descendants fighting for an ever-shrinking 
area of influence centered around the city of Samarkand. In a 
remarkable reversal of fortune, by 1530 Babur had defeated the 
Sultanate of Delhi and managed to bring much of north India un-
der his sway despite regarding it as “a country of few charms...of 
genius and capacity none.”11
 Many have argued that the religious policies espoused 
by Akbar as emperor were informed by his dynasty’s central 
Asian origins. Timur professed Islam; nevertheless his sectar-
ian sympathies are a topic of heated debate.12 Babur was not a 
very dynamic administrator, and he largely continued the mild 
Hindu persecution of the preceding Lodi dynasty; nevertheless  
Krishnamurti argues that “there was a vein of liberalism and a 
conspicuous absence of religious and sectarian bigotry in the 
Timurid family.”13 The mother of Humayun, Babur’s successor, 
was a Shi‘i, and this does not seem to have been a major issue. 
Bairam Khan, Humayun’s best officer, brother-in-law, and regent 
of the Mughal Empire for the first years of Akbar’s reign, was 
a Shi‘i as well, even if the charge that Akbar’s mother was a 
Shi‘i is now disputed.14 In the end it is clear that while the courts 
of Akbar’s immediate predecessors were not groundbreaking 
in their inclusivity, they were nevertheless quite eclectic, even 
within the bounds of an officially-propagated Hanafi Sunni para-
digm.15 Indeed it was from his early teacher Mir ‘Abd al-Latif 
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Quzwini that Akbar received the principle of sulh-i-kul (peace 
with all), which was cited often by his chroniclers as motivating 
his actions.16
 Akbar, who superseded his regent in 1562, is an intel-
lectual paradox who has fascinated historians for centuries. He 
ruled the Mughal Empire at its height of power and importance, 
greatly expanded its borders, and is generally remembered in 
India as a wise and just leader. The program of religious debates 
over which he presided in the Ibadat Khana (House of Worship) 
he built at Fatehpur Sikri, his capital, attest to his intellect and 
curiosity, yet even his fawning court biographer Abu al-Fazl 
admits that in his youth, “he was constantly weaving the disguise 
of insouciance,” enjoying “various kinds of hunting and other 
diversions so that a spectator might suppose that nothing but 
these amusements touched the hem of his heart.”17 In contrast to 
his grandfather, who famously wrote his own memoirs, he was 
illiterate and advocated families keeping one son unlettered in 
imitation of the prophets’ supposed illiteracy.18
 Despite his family’s heritage, Sharma argues that the 
young Akbar “formulate[d] his religious policy in [an] atmo-
sphere of mistrust and suspicion” among the wider Hindu major-
ity.19 Initially, he seems to have taken the position of an ortho-
dox Sunni. In 1556, at only fourteen, Akbar is believed to have 
personally executed the rebel Hemu for his Hinduism (despite 
Abu al-Fazl’s insistence “that his lofty spirit did not permit him 
to slay a captive”), and in 1567 he saw to the exhumation of the 
Shi‘i saint Mir Murtaza Sharifi Shirazi, an act that ruffled the 
feathers even of the hard-line Sunni chronicler al-Bada‘uni.20 
Yet by marrying a princess of the Hindu Rajput warrior class 
in 1562, he had already begun a process of bringing Hindus 
closer to the imperial fold.21 By 1580, there were forty promi-
nent Rajputs in the state apparatus, and it soon became clear that 
government appointments were not the limit of the emperor’s 
broad-mindedness.22 Under the influence of the popular Sufi 
saint Selim Chishti, in 1571 Akbar began building his capital 
at Fatehpur Sikri, and in 1575 the Ibadat Khana was ready for 
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debates to begin, that “all orders and sects of mankind...should 
assemble in the precincts of the holy edifice, and bring forward 
their spiritual experiences, and their degrees of knowledge of the 
truth in various and contradictory forms in the bridal chamber 
of manifestation.”23 Debates were held on Thursday nights and 
were initially limited only to various Islamic factions; by 1577 
however, Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Zoroastrians, Jews, and Chris-
tians were all encouraged to send representatives to the meet-
ings.24 To the more conservative Sunni ‘ulama’ in Akbar’s court, 
this was a calamity, as al-Bada‘uni reports:
Persons of novel and whimsical opinions, in accordance 
with their pernicious ideas, and vain doubts, coming out 
of ambush decked the false in the garb of the true, and 
wrong in the dress of right, and cast the Emperor, who was 
possessed of an excellent disposition, and was an earnest 
searcher after truth, but very ignorant and a mere tyro, 
and used to the company of infidels and base persons, into 
perplexity, till doubt was heaped upon doubt, and he lost 
all definite aim, and the straight wall of the clear Law, and 
of firm Religion was broken down, so that after five or six 
years not a trace of Islam was left in him: and everything 
was turned topsy-turvy.25
 Topsy-turvy or not, these developments represented 
the culmination of an already unprecedented phase in Mughal 
history. In 1563, early in his reign, he had abolished the pilgrim-
age tax levied on Hindus, and in 1564 he abolished the jizya 
(poll tax), establishing a de facto single citizenship for both 
Hindus and Muslims within the empire.26 In 1576 he endowed 
a Department of Pilgrimage (Daftar-i-Haj) to subsidize Muslim 
travel to the Hejaz, and in 1577 he halted the practice of the 
royal hunt, an abrupt about-face for such an avid hunter as he 
and probably reflective of his contact with Jainism. In 1578 the 
first Jesuit missionaries arrived at the royal court, and by 1582 
he is said to have instituted his controversial religious order, the 
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din-i-ilahi (divine faith), which the first Western biographers of 
Akbar viewed as apostasy from Islam, following at least some 
of Akbar’s contemporaries, and which later authors have sought 
to reconsider. Until his death in 1605, Akbar issued a vigorous 
stream of further decrees—allowing the propagation of temples 
and churches, as well as mosques, granting the city of Amritsar 
to the Sikhs, prohibiting certain kinds of marriage, male circum-
cision before a certain age, the killing of animals on certain days, 
and the Hindu practice of sati (the self-immolation of widows) 
among other things.27 While it is not unknown how far most of 
his prohibitions were obeyed outside the royal court, his eclectic 
sympathies must have been evident, and, as was rarely the case 
in Mughal India, he spent his last years in peace and security. 
Though his successors did not maintain many of his religious 
policies, he secured a legacy as one of India’s greatest rulers.
 The most important author by far to the study of Akbar’s 
reign is his official biographer Shaykh Abu al-Fazl “‘Allami” 
ibn Mubarak, who penned the Akbarnama, a fulsome, florid, and 
detailed account of Akbar’s life, and the Ain-i-Akbari, which is 
an exhaustive account of Akbar’s imperial regulations—mainly 
useful because of its many quotations attributed to the emperor. 
Another important body of sources consists of the dispatches of 
the hapless Jesuits who set out from Portuguese Goa to Fatehpur 
Sikri in three unsuccessful missions to convert the Mughals to 
Christianity. Their accounts are hampered by their poor com-
mand of Persian and their narrow fixation on converting the 
emperor to Christianity. Roy Choudhury, writing in the mid-
twentieth century, held that while European scholars of his day 
“generally treat these materials as invaluable sources of history,” 
the Jesuit records are plainly inaccurate in all sorts of ways and 
not useful without corroboration.28
 By far the most interesting of the major sources on 
Akbar is second volume of the Muntakhab al-Tawarikh of ‘Abd 
al-Qadir “Qadiri” ibn Muluk Shah al-Bada‘uni, who was a 
Hanafi ‘alim (legal scholar) and a childhood peer of Abu al-Fazl. 
Much has been made of the the trio of al-Bada‘uni, Abu al-
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Fazl, and the future poet laureate Abu al-Fayz, all of whom had 
studied under the famous Shaykh Mubarak as youths, and whose 
fortunes diverged afterwards—Abu al-Fazl and Abu al-Fayz to 
prestige and imperial favour, and al-Bada‘uni to the ranks of 
the Sunni ‘ulama’, of whom Akbar was not terribly fond. Al-
Bada‘uni’s account is notable for its attacks on Akbar’s religious 
policy, as well as its remarkable pettiness in other matters, al-
luding often to the travails of the author and referring to figures 
like Abu al-Fayz (who at least once interceded on behalf of 
al-Bada‘uni when the emperor had dismissed him) by the name 
“bastard” or “hellish dog.”29
 The historiography of Akbar’s Hindustan similarly 
bridges a wide gulf. The earliest European historians of India 
were justifiably awed by the grand profile that Akbar struck but 
were far too eager to take al-Bada‘uni and the Jesuit accounts at 
face value. Hence Vincent Smith’s characterization of the din-i-
ilahi:
The whole scheme was the outcome of a ridiculous van-
ity, a monstrous growth of unrestrained autocracy...The 
new faith was but a testimony of his grasping ambition, his 
pompous desire to be the emperor, Pope, and Prophet rolled 
into one...It was the love of power that induced Akbar to 
deny the authority of the Prophet and start a new religion.30
This was a view shared by H. Beveridge, translator of the Akbar-
nama, who in his introduction to volume three recounts several 
instances of Akbar’s “Timurid cruelty” on display. By contrast, 
the key Akbar scholars of the mid-twentieth century, like R. 
Krishnamurti, were Indian, Hindu, and eager to cast Akbar in a 
favorable light, as a civilizing force and a man ahead of his time. 
Modern scholarship is sparse on the subject of Akbar, but recent 
analyses like that of Iqtidar Alam Khan suggest that there is 
some pushback against this trend.
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Sunni ‘Ali and Sudanic Islam
 The history of Islam in the western Sudan is hard to 
piece together, obscured as it is by a paucity of consistently 
reliable sources. The first thing to emphasize is that prosperous 
trading societies clustered around the Niger River significantly 
pre-date the coming of Islam. The site of Old Jenne (Jenne Jeno) 
dates back to 250 BC, and archaeological studies suggest that it 
was not the only lively urban center in the area at the time.31 The 
predominant characteristic of the Niger River corridor through-
out its history has been its diversity. According to J. Spencer 
Trimingham, “thousands of political groups at all stages of 
development coexisted within the sphere of Mali”—from hunter-
gatherers and Zorko fisherfolk to Mande and Zerma sedentarists 
to Sanhaja Tuaregs and Berbers.32 These groups were organized 
politically, but not in the sense that the Mughal Empire was 
organized:
The real rulers of the Sudan were not kings and emperors 
but patriarchs of families, councils of elders, and chiefs of 
villages on the one hand, and the heads of superimposed 
clans on the other… ‘Empires’ were spheres of influence, 
defined not by territorial or boundary lines but by social 
strata, independent families, free castes, or servile groups 
of fixed status regarded as royal serfs. The ruler was not in-
terested in dominating territory as such, but in relationship 
with social groups upon whom he could draw to provide 
levies in time of war, servants for his court, and cultivators 
to keep his granaries full.33
 The more nebulous quality of political organization in 
the western Sudan by no means hampered the growth of large 
and prosperous, distinctly African polities, growing ever wealth-
ier through the taxation of gold production and passing cara-
vans.34 When ‘Uqba ibn Nafi‘ conquered the Maghreb coast for 
Islam in the late seventh century—later becoming the inspiration 
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by which many Sudanic groups came to claim Arab descent and 
sharif (noble) status—the animist Soninke state of Ghana was 
already well on its way to prominence.35
 Not much is known about early Ghana except through 
the second-hand account of the eleventh-century Andalusian 
trader Abu ‘Ubayd al-Bakri, who describes twin cities at the 
center of the empire—Koumbi for animists and Saleh (ten 
kilometers away) for visiting Muslim traders.36 According to 
al-Bakri, Muslims were apparently “deeply involved in the life 
of the state...as government officials, scribes and…other roles in 
which their literacy was useful to the Ghanaian rulers.”37 Such a 
modus vivendi is remarkable during this period, when belief in 
the absolute necessity of living within the umma (that is, the area 
of the world ruled by Muslims) was still strong, and especially 
considering the persistence of Khariji groups in the area until 
at least the late twelfth century.38 Trimingham and Davidson 
both attribute Ghana’s downfall to a crippling eleventh-century 
invasion by the Sunni fundamentalist Almoravids, but Hiskett 
expresses deep doubts over whether such an invasion really oc-
curred, positing alternatively that as the ruling dynasty declined, 
desert Almoravids peacefully integrated with the Soninke and 
brought about their conversion. The first theory seems best sup-
ported by chroniclers, while the second is more in keeping with 
David Robinson’s acculturationist theory of Islamization.39
 The immediate predecessor of the Songhay state was 
Mali, a Malinke entity with its capital at Niani that first emerged 
in the early thirteenth century under the leadership of the leg-
endary Sundjata. It grew larger than Ghana had, and most of its 
rulers were at least nominally Muslim—the most famous being 
Mansa Musa (mansa being a ruler’s title), who is remembered 
as a deeply virtuous Muslim outside Mali because of his lav-
ish hajj in the 1320s.40 His Islamic zeal, however, should not 
be overstated, for despite his construction of the Great Mosque 
at Timbuktu, Trimingham notes that “Islam was not allowed 
to interfere with the collection of gold” in non-Muslim areas, 
sorcery was widely feared, and Islamic conventions in marriage 
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and inheritance were often flouted.41 Ibn Battuta’s famous travel 
narrative is regarded as the best contemporary source for under-
standing the way Malian society functioned—on his trip there 
he finds himself both charmed by the number of virtuous Mus-
lim scholars he finds, while at the same time he is disgusted by 
the non-Islamic excesses of the mansa’s court and the common 
people.42
 Two things should thus be clear: that by the rise of 
Songhay in the fifteenth century, Islam already had an extensive 
history in the western Sudan, and also that, at the same time, 
the Maliki orthodoxy of the scholarly class was rarely (if ever) 
dogmatically enforced upon the population. Ruling families 
balanced Islamic observance with their traditional claims to 
legitimacy, which were invariably derived from non-Muslim 
traditions, and they had no desire to upset the status quo in either 
sphere.43
 It was in this context that the infamous Sunni ‘Ali, “the 
great oppressor and notorious evil-doer,” burst onto the scene 
in 1468, leaving the Songhay state’s traditional seat at Gao to 
capture Timbuktu from the Tuareg and subdue the remains of 
a declining Mali empire.44 His life from 1468 until his mysteri-
ous death in 1493 was spent in continual campaigning, and at 
his death Songhay was one of the largest political entities the 
Niger River corridor had ever seen. While nominally a Muslim 
his entire life (indeed, al-Bakri had reported as much about the 
ruler of Gao four centuries earlier), the conflict between the oral 
and written accounts concerning his reign could not be more 
extreme. His “strong and very popular” image in oral accounts 
among non-Muslims is vigorously opposed in chronicles like 
‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Imran al-Sa‘di’s Ta‘rikh al-
Sudan, which demonizes him for persecuting Islam in his empire 
and labels him “a tyrant, a miscreant, an aggressor, a despot and 
a butcher who killed so many human beings that only God Most 
High could count them.”45
 In the Ta‘rikh al-Sudan it is significant that among doz-
ens of ambitious, religiously-deficient rulers he is the only king 
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singled out for such abuse. His successor Askiya al-Hajj Mu-
hammad, who deposed the Sunni Abu Bakr after ‘Ali’s death in 
a coup, is lauded as a model of Islamic piety and kingship, and 
by the nineteenth century was considered a mujaddid (renewer) 
of the faith, despite having undertaken only one jihad.46 While 
he personally may have pursued a more vigorous orthodoxy than 
his predecessors (and was certainly more friendly to the schol-
ars), there is little evidence that his Islamic renewal went much 
further than that. Blum and Fisher, for example, suspect that 
many of his pro-Islamic ordinances were revoked before the end 
of his reign.47 It is clear as a consequence of this that Sunni ‘Ali 
and Askiya Muhammad present a distinct dilemma to students of 
Islamic history in the Sudan.
 Source material for this period in Sudanic history is not 
lacking but is less detailed and more opaque than the chronicles 
of Mughal India. The aforementioned Ta‘rikh al-Sudan of al-
Sa‘di is the best of the two Timbuktu tawarikh that cover this 
period; however, it was written a century and a half after the fact 
by a Moroccan whose critical concern was justifying the Sa‘di 
dynasty’s early seventeenth-century conquest of Songhay.48 The 
Replies of al-Maghili to Askiya al-Hajj Muhammad are a fairly 
contemporary source and treat many relevant legal topics but 
were written by an Algerian scholar. It is difficult to ascertain, 
therefore, how far his rulings were actually accepted by the 
askiya (ruler). Failing this material, a variety of more minor 
sources exist, as well as the aforementioned oral tradition and 
accounts of earlier and later Sudanic states. As for modern his-
toriography, opinions on Sunni ‘Ali’s rule and the role of Islam 
in Askiya Muhammad’s state oscillate between those of Lansine 
Kaba, who argues that the askiya was a vigorous advocate of a 
normative Sunni Islam which had threatened the legitimacy of 
his demonized predecessor, and the analysis of Levtzion, Blum, 
and Fisher who believe that the askiya’s eventual alliance with 
the Timbuktu ‘ulama’ was a way to co-opt political opposition 
and represented the final stage of a political and spiritual journey 
on the askiya’s part not attained until well within his reign.49
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Legitimacy and Religious Contention in the Islamic
Periphery
 The question of legitimacy must be central to any discus-
sion of Muslim ruler and ‘ulama’ in the peripheral context. Le-
gitimacy (and conflict between the pretenders to it) has been one 
of the Islamic religion’s greatest and most persistent dilemmas, 
dating back to the death of the Prophet himself—and it shows no 
sign of abetting in the present age. The great Sunni-Shi‘i schism 
that developed through the first centuries of Islam was originally 
centered on a simple (if intractable) dispute over caliphal suc-
cession; over time however, the two sides developed competing 
ideologies, with the Shi‘i minority maintaining their belief in a 
‘rightly-guided’ imam to act as a conduit between the temporal 
and the divine and the Sunni majority adopting the doctrine of 
ijma‘ (consensus), which eschewed the idea of an imamate in 
favor of the sovereignty of the Sunni madhahib (school of law). 
Significantly however, this only applied to religious matters, and 
the emerging Sunni establishment continued to endorse the no-
tion of a universal caliphate as a purely political office. Theoreti-
cally at least, in the early centuries of Sunni Islam, rulers had 
no legitimacy outside of their submission to the caliph. To live 
under the dominion of another ruler was to live outside Islam 
itself.50
 In the Sunni periphery, this principle of caliphal pre-
eminence soon broke down. Akbar was no sharif, nor could he 
distinguish himself as protector of Mecca and Medina as the Ot-
toman Turks had. Furthermore in Hindustan, where the Muslim 
population was in the minority and not expanding, such preten-
sions would have meant little to the majority of his subjects. Far 
more important to his legitimacy in India was his family’s claim 
to Timurid and Mongol heritage, which rendered his claim to 
sovereignty arguably more secure than that of the Safavids in 
Persia, who were originally mere Sufi shaykhs (elder or leader). 
As Akbar’s prestige grew, he took titles such as imam-i-‘adil 
(“just imam,” normally a Shi‘i epithet) and sultan-i-‘adil (“just 
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sultan”), which recalled the pre-Islamic Sassanid dynasty in Per-
sia.51 Early on he also won the Islamic title of gaza, but being a 
“warrior for Islam” was only a part of his legitimizing program.
 By the same token, while some rulers in the Niger River 
corridor claimed ‘Alid roots, this assertion never constituted 
the core of their claim to rulership, which remained rooted in 
local myth. While various colorful stories exist to explain the 
ascendency of Muslim dynasties, there is no reason to believe 
they were anything but instrumental to securing the goodwill of 
Muslim traders and scholars. The hajj was a more salient tool for 
Islamic legitimacy—as attested by the success of Mansa Musa 
and Askiya al-Hajj Muhammad in their efforts, but Blum and 
Fisher suggest that the pilgrimage might have been carried out 
in those cases by motives other than a desire for legitimation and 
caliphal blessing.52 For the sake of fostering trade relations, Su-
danic rulers were certainly apt to traffic in “pious fictions,” but 
the importance of such actions should not be overstated.53 This 
being the case, there does not seem to be much basis for Kaba’s 
characterization of Sunni ‘Ali’s rule as a “clash of civilizations” 
that threatened his legitimacy. Al-Sa‘di himself states that even 
though ‘Ali was by no means a righteous Muslim, his animus 
against the ‘ulama’ of Timbuktu was rooted in “their friendship 
with the Tuareg and membership in their elite.”54 According 
to al-Sa‘di, even Sunni ‘Ali used to say (referring to his own, 
friendly, ‘ulama’) that “without the scholars, life would not be 
pleasant or agreeable.”55
 As Muslim rulers in the periphery worked to tie them-
selves to the nations they oversaw, the ‘ulama’ found themselves 
weakened through their distance from the center. The Mughal 
Empire and the Songhay state were each dominated by a single 
madhab (the Hanafi school and the Maliki school, respective-
ly), and their distance from the key centers of Middle Eastern 
jurisprudence resulted in vigorous but stunted traditions in both 
areas. Their chief rivals were more likely to belong to a different 
religion than a different madhhab or sectarian affiliation, and be-
cause in both Africa and India the Muslim population constituted 
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a minority, spiritual prestige was to be gained either by integra-
tion into the local community (anathema to the more hard-line 
Sunnis) or alliance with the royal house. Thus, whereas Lapi-
dus traces the progressive divergence of madhhabi scholarship 
from palace writ and its maturation as the pre-eminent source 
of Islamic authority in the Middle East, in the periphery neither 
phenomenon could occur.56
 The result in Akbar’s India was a ghettoization of the 
Sunni religious establishment, where the Islamic sphere adopted 
a principle of ejus regio, cujus religio even as tremendous diver-
sity existed in the empire at large and, indeed, in Akbar’s court. 
As a result the emperor possessed a tremendously free hand in 
directing the spiritual atmosphere of his empire. Al-Bada‘uni 
reports that all the emperor’s ‘ulama’, “some willingly and the 
rest against their convictions,” signed his controversial “Infal-
libility Decree” of 1579, which proclaimed Akbar the final court 
of appeal for disputed matters of religion.57 Al-Bada‘uni finds 
himself constantly constrained by the fact that despite his criti-
cism of Akbar (and expression of abject hatred for the members 
of Akbar’s court), the Muntakhab al-Tawarikh exists through 
Akbar’s patronage, and al-Bada‘uni’s prestige is predicated 
on maintaining royal favor. Despite all of his misgivings with 
Akbar’s religious practices, al-Bada‘uni’s first reference to him 
is followed with a hearty “may he ever be firmly seated on the 
throne of the Caliphate,” and this jarring bipolarity pervades the 
work at large.58
 The situation of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karim al-
Maghili in Songhay, while different, hits upon the same themes. 
Born between 1425 and 1440 in Tilimsan, present-day Algeria, 
al-Maghili made a name for himself by persecuting Saharan 
Jews who did not conform to his understanding of the protected 
non-Muslim’s permanent condition of “humiliation and abase-
ment.”59 At some point in the late 1480s, perhaps frustrated 
with the lack of support at home for his fire-eating rhetoric, 
al-Maghili traveled to the Sudan and at some point may have 
settled in Gao.60 His discussions with the newly-enthroned skiya, 
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Muhammad, are recorded in the Replies, in which he unequivo-
cally declares Sunni ‘Ali and all those who supported him kuffar 
(unbelievers) and prescribes jihad against many of the practices 
about which previous Arab writers had complained including the 
free mixing of men and women, the use of amulets and talis-
mans, and non-Islamic inheritance practices. While Hunwick, 
Kaba, and others have interpreted the Replies as an example of 
the upright image Askiya Muhammad sought to project, Blum 
and Fisher note that many of its injunctions would have been 
out of line with the position of most of the askiya’s local ‘ula-
ma’. In their view, criticism of the status quo in Songhay is as 
much criticism of the current scholarly paradigm in the western 
Sudan as it is Sunni ‘Ali’s immediate legacy. Thus, for Blum 
and Fisher, al-Maghili represents a mere stage of the askiya’s 
religious policy, which finally settles in the bosom of the very 
scholars al-Maghili criticizes. To the state-dependent ‘ulama’, 
they argue, al-Maghili’s stern admonitions were an unwanted jolt 
to the establishment which the askiya came to view, by the end 
of his reign, as a fitting middle ground between the problematic 
religion of his predecessor and the austere belligerence of his 
foreign consultant.
 To men less dogmatically minded than al-Bada‘uni or 
al-Maghili, the path of integration was wide open. In India, this 
path was pioneered by figures such as Moin al-Din Chishti, 
founder of the Chishti Sufi order (not to be confused with Selim 
Chishti, who lived three centuries afterwards), the poet Kabir, 
and the practitioners of the Saini sect. Bairam Khan’s own son, 
Abd al-Rahim Khan Khanan, produced Hindi poems that “read 
like the outpourings of a great Vaishnava saint,” and in the 
diverse milieu of Akbar’s court, such cultural cross-pollination 
was encouraged—reaching a perverse climax when the hapless 
al-Bada‘uni was commissioned to translate the Ramayana into 
Persian.61
 In Africa, Nehemia Levtzion and Robinson have de-
scribed how the integrationist impulse manifested itself. In his 
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study of the Islamization phenomenon in West Africa, Levtzion 
describes three main Islamic groups: the sedentary ‘ulama’, 
who lived sheltered from the community at large and owed their 
existence to royal favor; the ruling warrior class, who professed 
Islam while being exempt from many of its obligations (such 
as marriage and alcohol regulations); and the clerical class, 
who attached themselves to trading parties and lived in the 
non-Muslim countryside. This last class was endogamous and 
maintained a consistent Islamic identity, yet over time clerics 
became so comfortable in the hinterland as to be found inhabit-
ing the remote forestlands south of the Niger River, “officiating 
at local shrines,” and acting as impartial mediators in the arbitra-
tion of local disputes.62 Robinson characterizes this fitful modus 
vivendi as representing the “Suwarian tradition,” named for the 
sixteenth-century Sudanic scholar al-Hajj Selim Suwari, who 
argued that it was perfectly permissible for Muslims to live out-
side the dominion of a Muslim ruler provided their non-Muslim 
ruler allowed them to practice their faith unhindered. According 
to Suwari, jihad was not an obligation for such Muslims, whose 
charge was rather to set a good example for their non-Muslim 
neighbors in the hope of their eventual conversion.63 Suwari’s 
words were a far cry, truly, from the hadith al-Maghili chooses 
quotes his fourth reply: “whoever dies with no oath of hom-
age (bay‘a) around his neck dies a jahili [ignorant, pre-Islamic] 
death.”64
 While the Suwarian vision prevailed among most west 
African Muslims in the intervening centuries, in some ways it 
was a victim of its own success. By the eighteenth century the 
city of Kano, in the north of present-day Nigeria, had become 
majority Muslim. In 1787 the Muslim reformer ‘Uthman dan 
Fodio declared a jihad in Kano, to reform what he saw as a cor-
rupt and un-Islamic ruling order—striking a remarkable victory 
for the hard-line faction of the historically beleaguered Islamic 
‘ulama’.65 The “Maghilian revival” that he initiated continues to 
reverberate throughout the region, most recently in the Tuareg 
Islamist rebellions that grip Mali in the present day. Meanwhile 
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in India, the integrationist era of Akbar failed to initiate any 
fundamental change to religious demography, despite adding so 
much to the richness of the Mughal cultural milieu. Nonetheless, 
one cannot deny that the position of the ‘ulama’ on the periphery 
of the Islamic world differed in important ways from the Middle 
Eastern norm.
 In essence, these differences boil down to an altered 
legitimacy dynamic between ruler and scholar. In the peripheral 
context, both are deprived of the kind of legitimacy they could 
claim in the metropole, but unlike the ‘ulama’, Akbar in Hindu-
stan and Sunni ‘Ali and Askiya Muhammad in Songhay drew 
upon alternate means of establishing legitimacy outside of Islam-
ic principles. The Sunni ‘ulama’, while still influential, became 
weak and incapable of mounting independent challenges to the 
religious policies of the sovereigns under which they labored. As 
a result, rulers like Akbar wielded enormous freedom—at least 
within the sphere of the court—to pursue policies widely at vari-
ance with the zeitgeist of mainstream Sunnism.
 Was resistance possible for the ‘ulama’? Perhaps, but 
their clout was sapped all the more significantly by the fact that 
for empires that did not root their legitimacy in Islam, contraven-
tion of Islam did not necessarily suggest illegitimacy. Dissenting 
scholars found themselves pushed either toward the embittered 
quietism of al-Bada‘uni or the freewheeling integration espoused 
by Indian Sufis and west African clerics of the Suwarian tradi-
tion. This consequence may explain part of the reason why these 
peripheral areas are so often excluded from studies of Islamic 
history. Over time the edifice of Islam seems to collapse into 
a sea of local culture, and thus the history of such areas seems 
more often the province of local specialists than Islamicists.
 Ultimately this investigation suggests that such an 
approach is misguided. To ignore the Islamic periphery is to 
neglect an exceedingly wide range of groups and phenomena 
which have much to add to the Western academy’s understand-
ing of Islam’s development, its social dynamics, and the ways in 
which elite and scholarly Islam have interacted alongside local 
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cultures and “popular” religious traditions. Obviously, much 
work remains to be done, and the subjects within the scope of 
this analysis require much more extensive study. But for those 
latter-day “paper-worshipping scholiasts” frustrated with inter-
minably reexamining the accepted medieval canon of Islamic 
history, a figurative journey to Akbar’s Ibadat Khana may be just 
the ticket.
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